I've read somewhere that the ratio of Soviet to German casualties on the eastern front was 1.4 for the whole war. But what about data for different stages of the war? (this ratio wasn't constant after all) Is there an analysis which explains the fluctations in that ratio in terms of major battles, offensive/defensive tactics, weapon developments etc.?
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As I understand it, the ratio of Soviet to Axis losses was something like 6 or 7 to 1 in 1941, perhaps 2 to 1 in 1942, and (close to) 1 to 1 in the latter part of the war. This includes not only German losses, but those of allies (principally Hungarians, Romanians, and Italians.) So Soviet to German totals would be higher. The Germans got off to a strong start in the first six months with relatively few casualties. If they had continued at that pace, they would have won the war. In 1942, the casualty rates of about 2 to 1 represented a rough equilibrium, of Soviet vs. Axis forces. After that, the Soviet loss rate, approaching 1 to 1, was less than their preponderance of manpower, which is why they ultimately won. In 1941, the Germans had the advantages of surprise, preparedness, superior tactical doctrine. In 1942, the Germans had lost the first two advantages, but their superior doctrine made the difference. By 1943, the Soviet forces had caught up, in some cases overtaken the Germans in quality of equipment, and doctrine. Only the effect of being on the defensive allowed the Germans to inflict losses as slightly greater than a 1-1 rate. |
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The Red Army was not an effective fighting force in the beginning, for many reasons. (Including the fact that Stalin had just slaughtered the officer corps) The early days of the war were largely a one-sided affair, where the German Army's biggest challenge was dealing with tens or hundreds of thousands of surrendering Soviet troops. As time progressed, the Soviets regrouped and pushed back. The Russian front was a massive conflict. Leningrad was under siege for nearly 3 years. The Battle of Stalingrad grinded on for months and killed over 2 million. Kursk was an epic battle the was the turning point of the war. From that point forward, the Germans were on the defensive, and engaged in a long battle of attrition, all of the way back to Berlin. I've never seen an accounting for casualties in a ratio form. There is plenty of data to calculate your own -- over 30 million were killed in this front of the war. |
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During the first three months the Soviet losses were about a million/month. They surrendered, because they wanted to fight against the SU. But Hitler refused them and they were all annihilated. Even Himmler was against such wastes. Very interesting period was also during the 1942 spring-summer advance of Germans. There raised an anticommunist rebellion in the eastern Ukraina and Cossacks regions of Russia. So, the SU troops escaped before the advance of Germans. Almost no losses on the both sides... The whole military losses of Germans was about 4.5 millions. Official military losses of SU - about 10 millions. so, no 1.4, but 2.2. (wiki) And other evaluations have much greater numbers for SU, up to 60 millions. I am not sure in that number, but the first one is obviously not real - with 3 mill only surrenderers during the first 3 months and 2.4 the next three, it is impossible to have 10 mill losses for the whole 4 - years war. Maybe, official "military losses" include only documented KIA. And in SU he, whose death was not documented as KIA, automaticaly were Lost In Action. And counted as traitors. |
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Who ever wrote this is wrong: "In 1941, the Germans had the advantages of surprise, preparedness, superior tactical doctrine. In 1942, the Germans had lost the first two advantages, but their superior doctrine made the difference. By 1943, the Soviet forces had caught up, in some cases overtaken the Germans in quality of equipment, and doctrine. Only the effect of being on the defensive allowed the Germans to inflict losses as slightly greater than a 1-1 rate." In fact according to: "Number predictions and war" by Depuy Germany remained man to man superior not just to the Western allied armies right up to the end of the war but considerably so to the USSR. Even by at Kursk Germany had a 256% fighting effectiveness advantage to the soviets, 1 German soldier was equal to 2.56 soviets in fighting ability. By 44, this advantage had dropped to 180%, one German soldier being equal to 1.8 soviets. Depuy study is exhaustive, and just goes to show this guy above does not know what he is talking about. Oh by the way Depuy factored in the defensive advantage the Germans had, this figure is minus that advantage. So on an even field basis, 100 German were equal to 180 Soviets. The soviets won because of overwhelming numbers, Hitler's stupidity and the second front, THE USA! Soivet battlefield losses in 44, 5,000,000. German losses 1,100,000. German losses are considerably less, obviously this guy is getting his figures from some Russian BS history book like wikipedia. (WW2: Allies mobilized against Germany 40.4 million, Germany Mobilized 12.5 million. Allied casualties 23 million, German 10.1 Million. Score effectiveness Allied .25, German 1.42. Which means one in four Allied soldiers inflicted a casualty on the Germans, while each German averaged nearly two Allied casualties. Even after Depuy adjusted for defense posture the German score rating was 1.42. Which was five times as great as the Allies. Scource: Depuy, "Numbers Predictions & War") |
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Nick, In an effort to ensure your post doesn't become fodder for Nationalists and Neo-Nazis, don't confuse Dupuy's conclusions. He did not conclude that the Germans were "man for man" better but rather that their leadership was better, particularly at the NCO level right up to the General Staff level. This is the primary reason, he concludes, that the German soldier fought with a higher effectiveness than their counterparts. It was NOT because Germans were some kind of supermen. |
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The vast majority of German soldiers were killed, taken POW or otherwise incapacitated on the Eastern front. The Soviet to Axis loss ratio was 1.3:1 and the USSR outproduced Germany in every weapons system throughout the war. According to meticulous post-Soviet archival work (G. I. Krivosheev in Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses), the total number of men (and in the Soviet case, about 1mn women) who passed through the armed forces of the USSR was 34,476,700 and through Germany's was 21,107,000. Of these, the "irrevocable losses" (the number of soldiers who were killed in military action, went MIA, became POWs and died of non-combat causes) was 11,285,057 for the USSR, 6,231,700 for Germany, 6,923,700 for Germany and its occupied territories, and 8,649,500 for all the Axis forces on the Eastern Front. Thus, the total ratio of Soviet to Nazi military losses was 1.3:1. Also, out of 5.2 million prisoners taken by Axis on Eastern Front 3.6 million died, and out of 5.4 million of Axis prisoners taken by Soviets only 824 thousand died, which also affects the total numbers of casualties. Axis' losses estimates were slacking in 1945 as power of Axis war machine was focused on keeping Soviets out of Germany, thus 8,649,500 Axis casualties is the lowest estimate. |
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Soviet military war dead is now estimated at between 27-35 million. So somewhere between 9 and 10 to one in favour of the Germans. |
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