You have to be very careful about films about the Napoleonic Wars. First off, there aren't that many, unless you include the Richard Sharpe made for TV series and various TV miniseries, about which I will speak later.
Of the actual feature films, I think War And Peace has been made twice, the only one worth watching being the Bondarchuk version. Bondarchuk also directed Waterloo, which though accurate to a point, contained many of the myths and fallacies endemic of British histories of the battle. This owes much to nonsense written about the battle by Capt William Siborne, who was not present for it but relied on heavily on accounts provided by officers to whom he was personally indebted for substantial amounts of money. Siborne's work was heavily used by Charles Oman, whose work was even more anglo-centric in nature and a lot of fallacies make their way into the popular history. In the film Waterloo for instance, when Drouet d'Erlon's corps attacks the allied line, Wellington is heard to remark "They're coming at us in the same old way," to which Picton replies "Then we'll have to greet them in the same old way."
All nice, but it's historical nonsense of the first order. d'Erlon's corps did not advance in the "same old way" meaning meaning "colonne de battalion par division," or the standard French battalion column. They advanced in in a rarely used formation dating back to the French Revolutionary wars knows as "colonne de division par battalion." In this formation, all eight battallions in the division were formed in line 3 deep, with one battalion behind the the other, giving the division a frontage of approximately 200 men, 24 ranks deep. The difficulty of repelling cavalry in this formation has much to do with the the chaos caused by Uxbridge's timely charge with two brigades of British heavies, but prior to this event, they came quite close to crumpling up the left of Wellington's line.
Siborne had access to this information but didn't understand the difference between "colonne de division par battalion" and "colonne de battalion par division," so in his history, and most everything British that followed, the French simply advanced in the "same old way."
Making films about Napoleonic battles is expensive. Thousands of extras are needed, not to mention horses, colorful uniforms and artillery. The battle sequences are difficult to film. Not to mention that the interest in the North American (the most lucrative) market is limited since Americans weren't involved. Waterloo was a box office failure. When "Master and Commander: The Far Side Of the World" a naval film of the same era was made, the enemy had to be changed from the Americans as in the book, to French, else it would never sell in America.
The TV miniseries are just that; soap operas about Napoleon and Josephine, often with battle segments stolen from feature films and plonked in. The Sharpe TV movies are comparatively low-budget affairs, without the money most of the time to properly depict the battles described in the books. Further, Bernard Cornwell who wrote the books, is as completely Anglo-centric in his views as Siborne and Oman, and his work contains many of the same mistakes or fallacies.
As I have previously posted, the French tactical system was a flexible one that made extensive use of combined arms and out of necessity during the Wars of the French Revolution. The problems that French commanders faced in this period was that while they could field large numbers of men making heavy use of conscription, these men lacked the training and tight discipline of the long-service armies of their enemies, which were still being trained and disciplined to 18thC standards. The tactical system that evolved, was one that relied on combined arms, "elan" (momentum), permanent divisions and the evolution of the army corps, and finally, commanders promoted up through proven ability rather than by aristocratic birth or purchase of commissions.
The system worked well enough for the French to stomp all over the other armies of Europe who used linear tactics and smaller, long service armies. Pretty much all of the armies in Europe, save the British and Portuguese who were British trained, eventually adopted or copied the French organization, though they continued to promote commanders based on things other than ability.
Finally, I will add that while the British who continued to use linear tactics were an important participant in the Napoleonic Wars in terms of their naval and financial contributions, they were a very minor player on land. Wellington, the only British army commander to have much success, never had many troops available to him in Portugal and Spain and even at Waterloo, only one third of his 75,000 men were British.