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On September 3rd 1939, when UK and France declared war on Germany, both ordinary Polish people and government officials became enthusiastic. There were spontaneous demonstrations of support for the French and British allies. People truly believed that Germans will soon be defeated.

And from what I see those thoughts were reasonable - if an allied offensive, no matter how poorly prepared, took place, the allies would soon be in Berlin. Hitler left only 23 divisions on Western front, while the allies had 110 divisions. And those Germans divisions were poorly equipped. The French had 4 to 1 advantage in artillery, 80 to 1 advantage in tanks and the Germans hardly had any planes there. During Nurnberg trial general Alfred Jodl admitted that the Germany would easily be defeated in 1939 if the allies helped the Poles. Hitler gambled and concentrated the bulk of manpower, as well as nearly all mechanised units and Luftwaffe on Poland. And it's not like it was just a logistical challenge of transfering those resources to the Western front in case of allied offensive - the Poles managed to destroy much of that equipment and that's the reason why Wehrmacht generals asked Hitler to postpone the invasion of France for next year.

What exactly failed in the allied camp in 1939? Was it military intelligence? Poor strategy of supreme command?

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No properly cited answer, but the fact that Churchill wasn't made Prime Minister yet in 1939 (he was in 1940 IIRC) may have been a contributing factor. –  DVK Sep 1 '12 at 21:52
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20 years before, they had had a horrible war. Chamberlain didn't want to start another world war, and wanted instead to solve the problem with diplomacy. –  Russell Sep 2 '12 at 3:27
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@Russell - this isn't really relevant to the Sept 39 situation, as Chamberlain and England did declare war and thus enter a World War. –  Oldcat Jul 22 at 16:50

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The Phoney War (Sitzkrieg, Drôle de Guerre, etc.) seems destined to remain one of the great mysteries of history. It is difficult to comprehend now, after the fact, how such an astonishing combination of missed opportunities, wishful thinking, and indecisiveness on the part of not just one, but two great powers, could have carried on for more than half a year.

The seventh episode of the 1998 documentary series Sworn to Secrecy: Secrets of War is devoted to Sitzkrieg: The Phoney War, and a good introduction. The period is also the subject of numerous books and papers— not to mention various conspiracy theories, and certain narratives of Western betrayal, especially in Poland. Full coverage is not possible in the space of an answer here, but this excerpt from William Shirer's The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich covers most the popular theories:

[D]efeatism [among] the French… the memories of how France had been bled white in the First World War… the realization by mid-September that the Polish armies were so badly defeated that the Germans would soon be able to move superior forces to the west… the fear of German superiority in arms and in the air. Indeed, the French government had insisted from the start that the British Air Force should not bomb targets in Germany for fear of reprisal on French factories.

Fundamentally the answer to the question of why France did not attack Germany in September was probably best stated by Churchill. "This battle," he wrote," had been lost some years before." … The price of those sorry Allied failures to act had now to be paid, though it seems to have beeen thought in Paris and London that payment might somehow be evaded by inaction.


I will provide a bit more detail on three factors:

1. Unpreparedness

The British and French governments held Hitler to be a bully, willing to instigate border skirmishes and bark rhetoric, but not start a full-scale war over Poland. In fact, Lord Halifax, the British Foreign Minister, believed that Hitler was about to back down; on August 31, hours before the outbreak of war, he said he had seen in Hitler “the first view of the beaten fox.” So much for that.

Both Britain and France had been re-arming in anticipation of future conflict, and the French had begun to mobilize their army as early as August 26, but the process was incomplete. French commanders reported that they would not have sufficient resources to mount an offensive until 1941–42, and even if that was an exaggeration, other papers have argued that early in the war, the British and French believed time was on their side because it would give them time to coordinate and mobilize the full strengths of their overseas empires. The calculation was not to defend Poland in the short term, but to defeat Germany in the long term.

The British forces were inadequate for mounting a full-scale offensive. The air force was concerned about bombing, because it lacked the means to stop retaliatory raids; the navy could not operate freely in the Baltic Sea; the British Expeditionary Force was quite small compared to the French army. And even the last would take took several weeks to cross the Channel, by which time Poland was already doomed.

Still, Germany had deployed most of its forces in the east, and at the Nuremburg trials, their generals testified that had France and Britain taken action early in September, the course of the war would have changed and Germany might well have been defeated.

2. Misunderstanding of modern warfare

According to William Shirer's The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, France was bound under treaty with Poland to attack Germany within three days of the order to mobilize, and to launch a major offensive within fifteen.

Gen. Gamelin was not a timid general, but he believed that any attack required an artillery barrage, and made his offensive and defensive plans according. The French army waited in the field while fixed artillery could be brought out from storage, shipped to the front, and assembled, and wanted for planes and tanks. A direct attack on Germany in the north was not possible without violating the neutrality of Belgium and the Netherlands; in the south, the French army did invade the Saarland on September 7 to fulfill France's treaty obligation, but did not advance far into Germany, stopping short of the Siegfried Line fortifications. And shortly thereafter, the Supreme War Council decided not to proceed with invasion, and ordered the army to retreat back behind the Maginot Line.

3. Fear of wider war and hope for a peaceful settlement

And why would the Supreme War Council do that? The horror of World War I was very much in the minds of European leaders. Fear and wishful thinking led them to hold out for what now seems like a foolish amount of time.

At the outbreak of war, Germany was allied with the Soviet Union, something that became clear when Soviet forces joined the invasion two weeks later. Chamberlain and Daladier did not want to risk angering Stalin and widening the war. They might have been able to send forces to reinforce Poland from the Mediterranean, but were not yet at war with Italy, and did not want to risk provoking Mussolini.

At the same time, Hitler was intimating with diplomats that Poland would at last appease him. On September 19 he declared in a speech that he had no war aims against Britain or France, and on the 28th Germany and the Soviet Union issued a statement that the matter of Poland having been "settled" (through their conquest and partition), there was no further cause for war. And the British were in contact with disaffected Germany military officers, hoping they would influence or overthrow Hitler. It did not come to pass.

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"Chamberlain and Daladier did not want to risk angering Stalin and widening the war." - this is complete bullshit. They knew very well that the USSR too long warned about Germany and suggested the collective defense. They also knew that the USSR was very much concerned about Germany. It is simply impossible that they feared that they could worsen relations with the USSR by attacking Germany. Just the opposite: they hoped that Germany will attack the USSR after Poland, so that the West could avoid the war. -1. –  Anixx Feb 8 '13 at 14:10
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Could the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact not have effected this? Seeing as it was signed in August 1939 it comes before the declaration of war and might have caused a rethink about foreign relations with the USSR. –  Kobunite Jul 12 '13 at 15:50
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indeed, the USSR were friendly with Germany prior to WW2. There was much trade between the countries, the USSR provided Germany with facilities to train their armed forces which they under the Versaille treaty were not allowed to do so had to do in secret, they had already agreed to divide up Poland between them. Of course it's likely both dictators (Hitler and Stalin) were intent on eventually invading the other's country and adding it to their empire, but that was not the political/military situation at the time. –  jwenting Jul 25 '13 at 5:52
    
I buy @Anixx's argument that Chamberlain and Daladier hoped that Hitler would attack Russia next than this silly notion that they didn't want to anger Stalin... –  Evil Washing Machine Aug 2 '13 at 15:27
    
I would add an important fact: France's generals were convinced that the Maginot Line was the best barrier against Nazi Germany, that Hitler would not dare attacking through it, and that the Ardennes forest would provide a natural shield for the weakest part of the Line. Which is why the German's generals chose to go through the forest. –  Thomas Apr 11 at 15:56

I remember from reading Churchill's memoirs that in September 1939 it was pretty much the consensus among western generals and politicians to take the defensive strategy. Everybody remembered costly offensives of WWI and preferred to count on the Maginot Line.

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I had the occasion to talk to a German History Professor who is a well-renowned WWII specialist (and Waffen-SS specialist). He told me this strategy was as that time the better thing for the Allies to do. –  Yves Jul 22 at 15:26

I believe the greatest allies mistake was made before Poland, during Munich treaty. Allies left Czechoslovakia to Germans in exchange of promised peace which never came. Czechoslovakia had a great defence line, better tanks thank germans, same quality airplanes and totally awesome and modern artillery which Germans totally missed. If the allies supported Czechoslovakia instead of thowing them to wolves Hitler was easily stopped before he started to plan attack Poland. Instead of that German army nearly doubled their supplies and weapon base after occupation of Czechoslovakia. Germans got the most modern artillery in Europe, many tanks even better than the German ones, many airplanes, huge load of ammunition anf fuel (they had fuel for 1 week before Munich). In Czechoslovakia Germans got also several top class factories already producting weapons. All these resources were used to conquer Poland, France and during attack in Soviet union later. I believe this was the greatest mistake of allies, they had chance to stop Hitler before real war even started but they supplied them instead.

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Very good point, but how does that answer the question? Anyway, +1 and welcome to the site! –  Felix Goldberg Feb 8 '13 at 14:21
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Welcome to the site, but this doesn't really answer the question. –  American Luke Feb 8 '13 at 15:32
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I totally agree with that. There are many historians in Poland who believe that if Poland did anything to stop Germans from taking over Czechoslovakia, things would be much different. But instead of acting, Poland took the opportunity to grab some arguable land too. –  Darek Wędrychowski Jul 12 '13 at 8:12
    
@DarekWędrychowski yes, Germany would just have had an excuse to invade Poland a year or two sooner... –  jwenting Jun 20 at 8:49

Preparing for war takes place over a matter of months, if not years. This is true physically, logistically, and psychologically. Basically, the Germans were ready for war in September 1939, the Allies were not.

One advantage enjoyed by the German army was the "practice" it had obtained in the occupation of both Austria and the modern Czech Republic (Slovakia became a satellite state). There was no resistance, but an occupation is an occupation, and the German army worked out a number of logistical bugs. The Allied armies had no similar experience.

Then there was Poland, a flat land made for German tanks in ideal (non hot, non rainy) early fall weather. Imagine a Germany army on the Polish border at the race track, supplies and ammunition in place, ready to charge across the starting line at top speed as soon as the starting gun goes off, crushing everything standing its way. With some help from the Soviet Union (totally unexpected by the Allies), the Germans are across Poland in about 30 days.

On the other side, you do have Allied armies with about a 5 to 1 numerical advantage against German defenders of the Siegfried line. A fifth of those troops are in Britain, across the English Channel, and will require time to deploy. Their symbolic importance is greater than their numerical importance, because the French won't move without them.

And the Allies weren't "at the race track," but at home, "heading down to the track." They could, and did cross the German border, but the experience of World War I had taught them that even with a 5-to-1 advantage, defeating a fortified enemy would take some time, certainly more than a month. And suppose they began to get the better of the defenders of the Siegfried line...

Buoyed by their recent victory, the invaders of Poland would have hurried back across Germany and smashed the Allied attack in late fall, possibly causing as much or more damage as they did in the invasion of France. On the other hand, the French experience (pre tank) was that they could hold on for a long time in a defensive war, which is the war they adopted.

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Your opening couple of paragraphs would be backed up by, IIRC, the reason for the Maginot Line; to fight a defensive early war while the Allies prepared to attack through Belgium. –  Kobunite Jul 26 '13 at 20:49
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I would add that the Germans had been strengthened by the Anschluss and the Czech arms industry in 1939. the armies that invaded Poland were relying heavily on Czech weapons. –  Yves Jul 22 at 15:24

Broadly speaking, there are two strategies in winning a war: "attrition" (starving the enemy into surrender) and "overwhelming" (defeating the enemy on the battlefield).

Both sides tried both strategies in the WW1, and, in the end, Entente won by attrition.

Moreover, the attempts at the battlefield victory were so costly, that the Western allies did not even consider it an option by the start of WW2.

Thus, the war plan included a rigid defence and a tight blockade, not a decisive offensive, public statements to the contrary notwithstanding.

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France wasn't prepared.

The French strategy in the late 30s (including the military industry which had been greatly weakened in the 30s) did'nt include attacking Germany before 1941. They could have invaded Germany (the Ruhr would have been sufficient) in 1936 (before the Anschluss and the annexion of the Czech arm industry). But it was clearly not possible in 1939 (lack of planes, lack of an effective offnsive supply chain, lack of efficient tanks, even if they had th best models at that time).

That's why they chose a defensive/attentist posture, that, strategically, was much likelier to succeed that the crazy German attack strategy that could have failed very quickly hadn't the French been so slow to react because of their rigidity, lack of efficient intelligence (or any intelligence), obsolete command structure and some unfortunate incidents (like half of the staff of the nothern French Army getting accidentally killed just before the discovery of the German attack).

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In addition to hoping for a negotiated solution, the Allies are unprepared for war. Germany had been rearming for years, while the Allies thought they were playing catchup. They knew their industrial capacity was superior, though, not to mention strategic advantage on raw materials thanks to their colonies. That's why they were content to hold the line, and exploit their economic advantages to rearm and build up a large modernized force that could be used in 1941 or even later.

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What exactly failed in the allied camp in 1939? Was it military intelligence? None of the above.

The only question is whether the creation of the Modern State of Israel in 1948 was a meticulous Rothschild New World Order plan or the product of about 10,000 improbable chance occurrences. [9]

The social cataclysmic events of two World Wars, the Holocaust and 70 million deaths, were never about a fanatical dictator who wanted to exterminate the Jews. Doctor Kubovy, from the Tel Aviv "Documentation Center", admitted in 1960 that "there is no document signed by Hitler, Himmler or Heydrich which speaks of exterminating the Jews"…and in 1981, Walter Laqueur, author of The Terrible Secret, admitted: "Until now, we have never found Hitler's order to destroy the European Jewish community, and in all probability the order was never given."

There is no order because Hitler used the term "Entfernung" - which translates to removal of the Jews - in this case entfernung of the Jews to Palestine.

The social cataclysmic events of two World Wars, the Holocaust and 70 million deaths, were about a financial dictator who wanted to help his grandfather entfernung the Jews to Palestine. [10]

Up until 1933, not enough Jews had been "re" moved to Palestine to suit the Zionist agenda. 70 Million Died So The Jews Could Have Palestine [ http://www.rense.com/general92/70m.htm ] this article was featured for 40 days on the front page of rense.com in the section "Facts Are Facts."

If 70 Million Died So The Jews Could Have Palestine is the Fact, then the following insights “bring history into accord with the facts:”

The influence of the con artist Cyrus Scofield and the Scofield Reference Bible, as the most important instrument for spreading the message of Christian Zionism: that the modern State of Israel is the fulfillment of biblical prophecy.
The Beer Hall Putsch, The Munich Agreement and Zionist Collaboration with the Nazis are anomalies that can finally be reconciled. Part 3: Adolph Hitler: Providence, Miracle, or What Really Happened?
Adolph Hitler, a gay prostitute and a street cleaner, who made every mistake possible in his failed attempt to take over the world, can finally be understood.

And most importantly World War I, considered by historians to be a pointless tragedy, created the League of Nations (predecessor to the United Nations), the Versailles treaty (leading directly to World War II) and the Modern State of Israel. The US entry in the war was the first step in ending a history of non-intervention and isolationism in America (the nail in the isolationism coffin didn’t happen until World War II). Looking back at history we can see that the increase in anti-Semitism after 1933 and the dramatic events in pre-war Nazi Germany and the Holocaust would convince thousands of Jews they needed their own state to escape persecution.

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This is a conspiracy rant, not an answer. –  Semaphore 2 hours ago

Clearly the desire to intervene was not there in the allied ranks. An early attack in the north by the British whilst the poles still held out would have spurred France on and forced the German army to falter. Would Churchill have gone for broke possibly Chamberlain never

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The French had a fortress mentality and would rather sit behind the Maginot Line than take any risky adventure.

the ineffectual Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain was paralysed by indecision and churchill did not ascend to the Prime Ministership until the invasion of France on 10th May 1940.

What you had was a vacuum of leadership. Churchill on the other hand was a military man who had been involved in the charge of the dervishes during the conflict in Sudan, where he had learned the need for decisive action.

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The fortress mentality was mainly justified, but it was much too rigid. The lack of leadership was mainly in the French military (the reason why Paul Reynaud, the French head of government, wanted a surrender rather than an early peace, to make the military bear the historical responsibility). –  Yves Jul 22 at 15:20

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