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2

They aren't comparable. The Japanese soldiers in the Pacific Islands were crack troops that had been fighting bloody battles for years. They were mentally prepared to fight to the end. The Japanese army in Manchuria was just a light infantry garrison for suppressing guerillas. It hadn't fought any real armies since the Soviets and the Japanese signed the ...


8

Because the Japanese Government surrendered on 15 August. Naturally, the Japanese military was ordered to lay down their arms. For Manchuria this meant the much-reduced Kwantung Army, which accordingly surrendered as a unit to the advancing Soviets. There is a surprising amount of confusion over when exactly the surrender took place. A quick search found ...


2

Awareness of the atomic bombing of Japan and the firebombing of Japan in popular histories—histories held by the public itself—vary largely based on both the myths of public histories (histories produced by state agencies) and the public's reception of these. While the public of Japan is a peculiar exception, generally, the publics of the world have been ...


1

The Akagi was a battlecruiser, but when the decision was made for the second carrier, the Japanese wanted a carrier that was even larger than the Akagi, that is, more like a battleship than a cruiser. When the Japanese converted the Akagi, they "supersized" it, making it almost battleship size. The new "Akagi" was much closer in size to the Kaga than to the ...


2

There's three questions here. Was Japan a threat? If not, could it be a threat again? Would Japan surrender without the atomic bomb or invasion? These are aspects of the larger question, "was the atomic bomb and invasion necessary"? That's a big question with lots of moving parts that's still debated by professional historians, so it's good to reduce ...


2

I think the possible answer could fall into how to tread the OP's word "capable of maintaining the war".... Thus I would like to analyze between the "material capability side" and the "spiritual capability side". Material Capability Side From this source Data comparison ( From 1941 to 1945 ) The number of soldiers ( including civilian related ...


2

Agnes Smedley, Communist spy and triple agent, was writing much of the "reporting" about the Communist army in the field. So, an independent observer rating of less than zero. She also helped the Communists by suckering Gen. Smedley to send them arms. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/venona/dece_smedley.html


12

Japan was not really capable of "maintaining war" by mid-1945. The problem was that it was unwilling to "make peace" on anything like reasonable terms. If the Allies had wanted a stop to the fighting, one possibility might have been a "cease fire in place." That would leave the Allies in possession of the Philippines, and Iwo Jima and Okinawa, but it would ...


0

The Japanese were a very pro Anglo-Saxon country. This is indicated by their twentieth century track record. In 1902, they concluded a naval treaty with Britain, in 1940, they became part of Germany's Axis, and after World War II, they became America's ally. Beginning with the Meiji Restoration, they tried to imitate the Anglo-Saxon countries, particularly ...


2

I think you are formulating the debate in the wrong terms. There were Japanese who correctly believed that the war was lost, nukes or no nukes. There also were Japanese, who believed that an honorable settlement was still possible, through some far fetched pipe dream scheme like Soviet mediation or Kamikaze pilot wild successes. Nukes gave the former a ...


12

The answer to this question is yes, Japan was capable of maintaining the war at the time and likely would have done so. However, Japan was incapable of conducting meaningful offensive operations by then. So, in a sense they couldn't have hurt the U.S. but they would have hurt many others. U.S. General Curtis LeMay was responsible for implementing the ...


27

No. Japan had almost no capability to continue waging war. In fact, strangled by the American blockade, Japan was tottering on the brink of collapse. Experts both then and since believed that the combined pressure of the Soviet entry, the relentless blockade (and usually, the conventional aerial bombardment campaign) would have compelled Japan to surrender. ...


4

You can never be sure that a naval blockade will indeed lead to a national collapse. E.g., Britain did not surrender. Why do you think Japan would have? You must also remember the international situation: what if the SU would land in Japan and occupy it? By mid-1945 is was already a fact that, despite numerous agreements and promises of free elections, SU ...


0

"Creating a battle plan that depends on the enemy's cooperation is a beginner's mistake." They did not have any shortage of such mistakes. They fought Midway with the expectation that the US carriers wouldn't show up until they took the island. That's why their entire fleet was armed with land attack armaments at the time the USN showed up, and Nagumo ...


0

Not Nazism, but I would point you to a man called Jakob Meckel, who was the founding instructor of the Japanese Army War College. Literally all of the Japanese Army high command then was his student, or his student's student, or so on. Their army high command was far more drawn to Prussia and Germany culturally than they were to the United States or ...


0

I'd like to start by saying that, at least up until 1942, neither of the two openly advocated racism against any ethnic or religious group. Nor do we find racism to be a salient feature in the society of the two countries at the time. Rather, much of the horrendous acts of World War 2 were done out of a mentality shaped by bigotry. It was generally believed ...


0

The Japanese rebellion was caused by heavy taxes and Christians being persecuted. Its not like the taiping rebellion which was a cult organized by someone power hungry. So it probably didn't remind the Japanese of anything since there's such a big difference between what they are seeing in China, which was a deadly civil war, and their own much smaller ...


9

Midway was a distraction at a critical moment in the battle, but this more due to luck than anything else. If you replay the Battle Of Midway over again, it is unlikely it would have turned out that way again. Despite the US advantage of surprise and Japanese overconfidence, so much of the battle was down to luck. Midway made three important (I won't say ...


0

In many ways it was an alliance based on "my enemies enemy is my friend" After the Washington Naval Treaty Japan was very unhappy with the manner in which she was treated. In particular the UK was already distancing itself; having been strong allies in the Great War we were prepared to sacrifice this for a convenient political solution that saved us money ...


3

There are several points to consider here: Firstly - most warships (capital - i.e. Battleships, Battle cruisers and Heavy cruisers had multiple decks. The first deck usually was meant to remove the ballistic and armour piercing caps (ballistic was thin light metal to allow the projectile to pass through the atmosphere more easily - meaning a higher ...


5

The direct military effect of the land based bombers was zero, as they did not inflict a single hit on the Japanese fleet in their multiple sorties. Level bombing was very ineffective during the entire war in hitting Japanese ships in motion, and none of the planes on Midway were trained in the dive-bombing attacks that would prove crucial. The distraction ...


6

First of all, largest caliber AA guns are generally used for far-distance defense by producing air bursts near the planes, and medium and small caliber AA gun supported the near-distance deference. In WWII 5" AA gun shoot down 30% of enemy planes, similar to the percentage of 20mm Oerlikon and 40mm Bofors. 5" gun is effective to deal with kamikaze, but it is ...


8

Initially, Japanese observers thought the Taiping Rebellion was a nationalist revolt by Ming China loyalists. This perception was encouraged by for instance the rebel slogan "Destroy Manchuria, Revive Han China (滅満興漢)". Thus, Japan believed the rebellion to be an attempt by the subjugated Han Chinese natives to free themselves form their Manchurian ...


51

Also, correct me if I'm wrong but the heavy AA guns appear like they can't point down over the deck. They can only point upwards or parallel to the surface, but not down at the surface. This assumption is wrong. The US Mark 12 5"/38 caliber dual purpose (surface and aircraft) mount was the primary heavy AA armament facing kamikazes. It was mounted on ...


6

As for strategy, in general going for the side of an American WWII capital warship would probably not be the most effective approach. During WWI the US pioneered an approach to warship armoring popularly titled All or Nothing. The idea was that any armor incapable of stopping a capital ship shell or torpedo/mine from damaging a battle-critical component ...


6

Yes, the USS Enterprise was hit near the waterline in by a Kamikaze in1945 and it stuck in the side until broken up by wave action. From the page "Kamikaze Damage to US and British Carriers". The side of a major ship was much more resistant than the wooden flight deck of US carriers, and the deck was also a better target due to the fuel and bombs that ...


11

Yes. The most famous example is an embassy to Rome sent by several Christian daimyo from Western Japan. Consisting of four teenage envoys and a number of attachés, the group departed from Nagasaki on 20 February 1582 and reached Lisbon on 10 August 1584. In addition to meeting Pope Gregory XIII, the Japanese toured Spain and visited several Northern Italian ...


1

The Japanese primary strategy was to create an East-Asia Prosperity sphere of influence, including SE Asia, parts of China and Indonesia. This also fit in with their desperation for resources, especially oil (see, for instance, the book The Prize by Daniel Yergin). SE Asia also had bauxite for Aluminum refining (as did the Caroline Islands, see Aluminum ...


7

Kindly allow me to update completely. As a starter, I being a native speaker, kindly be reminded it would sound very strange when the OP says "Kantai Kessen, the Japanese naval strategy for a Pacific war" ( Excluding the fact that the Wiki was updated by someone ). The reason is, simply, in term of the usage of the word. Kantai Kessen simply denotes the one ...


23

The Japanese navy had a fundamental misunderstanding of the American navy, in large part because of its experience with other, European navies such as those of Russia and Britain. And perhaps they were confused by America's War Plan Orange," which preached similar doctrine, but was more "honored in the breach than the observance." In the 1905 war with ...


24

Many people seem to be confused that this was a plan developed during or just prior to WWII to defend the home islands, this is not true. Kantai Kessen was developed and adopted after the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905) and well before the US entered WWII (1941). With that in mind, answers must take into account the interwar situation and mindsets of the ...



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