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The fall (and rise) of lances were tied to other developments regarding horse troops. It was the (original) "cavalry" that used pointed weapons from the lances, dating back to the Middle Ages. By about the 17th century, there was a new type of horse soldier, dragoons, who were mounted infantry, rather than cavalry. As such, they were "musketeers" on horses, ...


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Because lances were unwieldy but required significant training to be proficient in. Their usefulness was progressively declining against the increasingly attractive (and cost-effective) firearms. Because of the nature of the weapon, and the training required to produce a proficient lancer, it had generally fallen from use by the mid 17th century. - ...


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There are a lot of great answers here focusing on the material side of things: how many soldiers can a state feed/arm/support/hire? I want to complement these with an ideological factor. While people can be conscripted or paid to fight, mobilization is always easiest when the population is eager to serve. Some ideologies increase the supply of willing ...


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The other answers cover most of what is being asked here but I thought I should add that a major factor in what caused these inabilities was a lack of economies of scale. Whereas the Romans had highly organised production, distribution and retail of both consumables and materials, the Feudal era was highly decentralised. The Feudal era fiefs had only small ...


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Mail is actually a heatsink: it draws the heat out of you. The same principle is employed in the construction of computers. In hot weather mail makes you cooler. Indeed, the first people to use mail extensively were the Romans, who fought mostly in and around the Mediterranean and other such hot climates. The only problem is that when directly exposed to ...


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A lot of this is down to differences in how the various states were organized. Rome was a highly centralized imperial state, with its own currency and taxation. The states of Medieval Europe for the most part did not have a money economy. The Feudal System was basically their answer to how one runs a country and maintains a professional military (an ...


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Basically, European "states" were all smaller than the Roman Empire, in reach and population for 1000 years or so after the fall of Rome. More to the point, they were mostly subdivided into feudal principalities for most of the period. Rome in 278 BC had better control of "half of Italy" than Paris over all of (or even half of) France in 1346 A.D. At its ...


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Things to consider: First, it is difficult to assess the size of armies in the Middle Ages. Roman troop strength is relatively easy to calculate by knowing the legions involved (the legions usually having the same size), but medieval armies usually had no such regularity. Smaller polities (kingdoms and or counties instead of empires) meant smaller ...


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A major reason would be logistics. It's not all about population sizes. The strength of an army is constrained not just by its manpower sources, but also by the logistical infrastructure available to pay for, feed, and equip it. The Romans in particular were much better at this than the feudal states of Medieval Europe, which tended to be quite factious and ...


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It is called a gorget. In certain military traditions it served as a mark of leadership. I cannot cite my source, but I recall reading a speculation that it may have evolved from the full cuirass that was worn by knights in antiquity. With the advent of gunpowder, such body armor was no longer of practical use, but the gorget served as a reminder of the old ...


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It is not easy to see any detail of the aircraft but they do look like they could be DH4's which were in US service from 1918-1932, which while a very wide time window is consistent with the vehicles in the picture. Formation of DH4s, 1920s, US National Archives


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In Rome at War, Nathan Rosenstein provides a very careful study of mortality rates in the Republican Army from 200-168 B.C. The overall mortality rate strictly attributable to combat is estimated to be 2.6 percent of soldiers per year (125). Overall mortality is estimated at 4.75 to 5.45 percent of soldiers per year, with non-combat mortality amounting to ...


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Ancient world had bloody history in the East throughout. Casualties were vast and sometimes entire armies were slaughtered. First example which I cite, is the Battle of Kalinga . It is one of the bloodiest battles of history. The casualties and horrors of the war changed Ashoka's heart. That's how we see so much of Buddhism around us. The Battles of Tarain ...


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(I make a few generalisations here, beware) Economy of scale is a factor in the production of maille, especially in Europe during the early medieval period. During much of the Roman period, iron was mined - mining (espeically deep mining) is an extremely labour intensive activity which can only be supported by a stable and sophisticated economy. The ...


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It might be informative to look at how people make chain-mail today, e.g. http://metalsmithing.wonderhowto.com/how-to/make-chain-mail-armor-from-start-finish-0118499/ While medieval armorers didn't have the options of working in aluminum or titanium, I doubt that much else has changed. Looks fairly labor-intensive but, as noted above, much of it is ...


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You will find some cost/price data here: List of Prices in Medieval England Image of the Armour data: Expensive is a relative and subjective term, the best that can be done to answer the question as asked is to compare the prices with typical incomes/pay. For such a we find that a labourer would earn 1-4 pence per day (the lower pay is earlier the higher ...


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Chain mail is more expensive primarily because it is more labor intensive to make it, and that has always been the case. However, anyone who wanted to use any form of armor had to decide what form of protection they wanted and then decide whether or not the extra expense was justified. Chain mail could tend to be heavier and would concentrate most of the ...


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The other answers are all correct and worth an upvote. Money, land-bound, defensive mentality were factors. However, I will add one key element the others have not mentioned, which is that it was a deliberate part of their strategy. Soviet military planners considered the United States to be a threat to their polity and they deliberately made an "anti-USA" ...


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I looked up Ienaga's book, which seems to be generally speaking a cerdible source. However, the pages where he discusses the 8th Route army and the Communist resistance to the Japanese in general (pp. 88-96) are actually not as well-documented as the rest of the book. His main argument is basically that the Communists were so successful in their ...


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The Communist army did not oppose the Japanese in any meaningful way. One report they sent to Stalin listed casualties as 97% KMT and 3% 8th Route Army. Also, the Communists had no heavy weapons so they could not fight in the field anyway and simply had to retreat. Much of the fighting with the Communists was not even done by regular soldiers, but by ...


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The Communists didn't use "better" tactics than the Nationalists. But they used different, specifically guerrilla tactics. For instance, both the Japanese and Nationalists fought along fixed lines. Then the idea was to break the enemy line, and once this was accomplished, you won the battle. On the other hand, the Communists would fight on an "all points" ...


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Because they were not "better" or "more effective". There are generally poor reports of the People's Liberation Army's effectiveness against Japan during World War II. - Elleman, Bruce A. Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989. Routledge, 2005. Keep in mind that comparisons are difficult to make because the Nationalists[1] bore the brunt[2] of all ...


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Short answer: Soviet equipment was quite good, but their commanders stank. They got lucky that a few brilliant commanders survived the purges and were given a free hand at Khalkhin Gol. The problems of the Soviet army in WWII are more ones of leadership than material. They had the men, the equipment, and the tactics, but they had few good leaders to take ...


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People commemorate important events even when they were failures - for various reasons. Propaganda Often they need a rallying point - an inspiring example for the war which is yet to be fought. E.g., the Battle of Chemulpo Bay was a resounding defeat for the Russians. The official Russian propaganda turned that into a momentous act of heroism. The Russian ...


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The seamen look USN-ish, the barrels of a heavy triple turret are in view in the foreground. This looks like the quarterdeck of a USN 14 inch gunned battleship in the inter-war period. In fact the aircraft looks near identical to the one in the photo of the Oklahoma allegedly circa 1920 attached. Not that the ship is necessarily the Oklahoma. US Navy and ...


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In May 1922 Republican forces took over Kilkenny Castle.


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Your premise is wrong. The statement, "Based on this question and an answer, it appears that although almost all southern white men of draft age were in the military during the Civil War." is untrue. The relevant "evidence" from the question is: "In my geneology research, I can assume with some certainty that if a white southern family had sons born ...


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Fort August was besieged on 3 March, 1746, and surrendered two days later. If not the absolute last, this was certainly one of the latest successful sieges in Britain. This followed an earlier action in December 1745 when Fort August was captured by government-aligned militias. If we were to be picky about the name, the last successful siege of a placed ...


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First, according to the 1860 Census, there were 3,526,195 free men, aged 20-39 in the states that would not secede. 3,475,987 of these men were white. Second, according to the National Parks Service, 2,672,341 men enlisted in the Union Army, 2,489,836 of which were white. Around 67.8% of enlisted soliders were between the ages of 20-39. To estimate ...



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