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The U.S. contributions to World War II fell under three broad categories:

  1. Lend Lease Aid to key Allies such as Britain, the Soviet Union and China.
  2. Fighting Germany's allies, Japan and Italy
  3. Introduction of U.S. air and ground forces into western Europe.

In the 1945 book, the main U.S. contribution to the war was the defeat of Japan (with China becoming a "third world" power aligned neither with the United States nor Nazi Germany). That was basically a minimum condition for American survival.

The hypothesis from my unpublished World War II book "Axis Overstretch" is that the Axis win if they ever obtain control of 50% or more of the world's industrial capacity. According to Paul Kennedy's "Imperial Overstretch," North and South America had just under 45% of the world's industrial capacity in the 1940s. Add Australia, Japan and the latter's holdings in the ASEAN nations of Southeast Asia, and you get just over 50% for the U.S.-led bloc.

The 1945 book presupposed the failure of American Lend Lease aid and the resulting inability of America to protect Britain and the Soviet Union. In the "real" war, American Lend Lease aid approximated the total Axis output, thereby giving America's allies a baremeaningful preponderance of material against the Axis, which was enough for them to survive.

The introduction of American military forces in western Europe was the "icing on the cake," that sealed the fate of Nazi Germany. Even without this, the more pressing need was to ensure the survival of Britain and the Soviet Union, and the defeat of Japan. Britain and the Soviet Union had a bare preponderance of strength against Nazi Germany alone (the danger of U.S. non-intervention was that Japan would tip the balance in Germany's favor). Throw in U.S. power and the "bare preponderance" of Allied power in Europe becomes overwhelming.

The U.S. contributions to World War II fell under three broad categories:

  1. Lend Lease Aid to key Allies such as Britain, the Soviet Union and China.
  2. Fighting Germany's allies, Japan and Italy
  3. Introduction of U.S. air and ground forces into western Europe.

In the 1945 book, the main U.S. contribution to the war was the defeat of Japan (with China becoming a "third world" power aligned neither with the United States nor Nazi Germany). That was basically a minimum condition for American survival.

The hypothesis from my unpublished World War II book "Axis Overstretch" is that the Axis win if they ever obtain control of 50% or more of the world's industrial capacity. According to Paul Kennedy's "Imperial Overstretch," North and South America had just under 45% of the world's industrial capacity in the 1940s. Add Australia, Japan and the latter's holdings in the ASEAN nations of Southeast Asia, and you get just over 50% for the U.S.-led bloc.

The 1945 book presupposed the failure of American Lend Lease aid and the resulting inability of America to protect Britain and the Soviet Union. In the "real" war, American Lend Lease aid approximated the total Axis output, thereby giving America's allies a bare preponderance of material against the Axis, which was enough for them to survive.

The introduction of American military forces in western Europe was the "icing on the cake," that sealed the fate of Nazi Germany. Even without this, the more pressing need was to ensure the survival of Britain and the Soviet Union, and the defeat of Japan. Britain and the Soviet Union had a preponderance of strength against Nazi Germany alone (the danger of U.S. non-intervention was that Japan would tip the balance in Germany's favor). Throw in U.S. power and the "bare preponderance" of Allied power in Europe becomes overwhelming.

The U.S. contributions to World War II fell under three broad categories:

  1. Lend Lease Aid to key Allies such as Britain, the Soviet Union and China.
  2. Fighting Germany's allies, Japan and Italy
  3. Introduction of U.S. air and ground forces into western Europe.

In the 1945 book, the main U.S. contribution to the war was the defeat of Japan (with China becoming a "third world" power aligned neither with the United States nor Nazi Germany). That was basically a minimum condition for American survival.

The hypothesis from my unpublished World War II book "Axis Overstretch" is that the Axis win if they ever obtain control of 50% or more of the world's industrial capacity. According to Paul Kennedy's "Imperial Overstretch," North and South America had just under 45% of the world's industrial capacity in the 1940s. Add Australia, Japan and the latter's holdings in the ASEAN nations of Southeast Asia, and you get just over 50% for the U.S.-led bloc.

The 1945 book presupposed the failure of American Lend Lease aid and the resulting inability of America to protect Britain and the Soviet Union. In the "real" war, American Lend Lease aid approximated the total Axis output, thereby giving America's allies a meaningful preponderance of material against the Axis, which was enough for them to survive.

The introduction of American military forces in western Europe was the "icing on the cake," that sealed the fate of Nazi Germany. Even without this, the more pressing need was to ensure the survival of Britain and the Soviet Union, and the defeat of Japan. Britain and the Soviet Union had a bare preponderance of strength against Nazi Germany alone (the danger of U.S. non-intervention was that Japan would tip the balance in Germany's favor). Throw in U.S. power and the "bare preponderance" of Allied power in Europe becomes overwhelming.

3 deleted 15 characters in body
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The U.S. contributions to World War II fell under three broad categories:

  1. Lend Lease Aid to key Allies such as Britain, the Soviet Union and China.
  2. Fighting Germany's allies, Japan and Italy
  3. Introduction of U.S. air and ground forces into western Europe.

In the 1945 book, the main U.S. contribution to the war was the defeat of Japan (with China becoming a "third world" power aligned neither with the United States nor Nazi Germany). That was basically a minimum condition for American survival.

The hypothesis from my unpublished World War II book "Axis Overstretch" is that the Axis win if they ever obtain control of 50% or more of the world's industrial capacity. According to Paul Kennedy's "Imperial Overstretch," North and South America had just under 45% of the world's industrial capacity in the 1940s. Add Australia, Japan and the latter's holdings in the ASEAN nations of Southeast Asia, and you get just over 50% for the U.S.-led bloc.

The 1945 book presupposed the failure of American Lend Lease aid because of German submarine warfare (against Britain) and the unfortunate captureresulting inability of Russia Baku,America to protect Britain and the bulk of its oil reservesSoviet Union. In the "real" war, American Lend Lease aid approximated the total Axis output, thereby giving America's allies a bare preponderance of material against the Axis, which was enough for them to survive.  

The introduction of American military forces in western Europe was the "icing on the cake," that sealed the fate of Nazi Germany. Even without this, the more pressing need was to ensure the survival of Britain and the Soviet Union, and the defeat of Japan. Britain and the Soviet Union had a bare preponderance of strength against Nazi Germany alone (the danger of U.S. non-intervention was that Japan would tip the balance in Germany's favor). Throw in U.S. power and the "bare preponderance" of Allied power in Europe becomes overwhelming.

The U.S. contributions to World War II fell under three broad categories:

  1. Lend Lease Aid to key Allies such as Britain, the Soviet Union and China.
  2. Fighting Germany's allies, Japan and Italy
  3. Introduction of U.S. air and ground forces into western Europe.

In the 1945 book, the main U.S. contribution to the war was the defeat of Japan (with China becoming a "third world" power aligned neither with the United States nor Nazi Germany). That was basically a minimum condition for American survival.

The hypothesis from my unpublished World War II book "Axis Overstretch" is that the Axis win if they obtain control of 50% or more of the world's industrial capacity. According to Paul Kennedy's "Imperial Overstretch," North and South America had just under 45% of the world's industrial capacity in the 1940s. Add Australia, Japan and the latter's holdings in the ASEAN nations of Southeast Asia, and you get just over 50% for the U.S.-led bloc.

The 1945 book presupposed the failure of American Lend Lease aid because of German submarine warfare (against Britain) and the unfortunate capture of Russia Baku, and the bulk of its oil reserves. In the "real" war, American Lend Lease aid approximated the total Axis output, thereby giving America's allies a bare preponderance of material against the Axis.  

The introduction of American military forces in western Europe was the "icing on the cake," that sealed the fate of Nazi Germany. Even without this, the more pressing need was to ensure the survival of Britain and the Soviet Union, and the defeat of Japan. Britain and the Soviet Union had a bare preponderance of strength against Nazi Germany alone (the danger of U.S. non-intervention was that Japan would tip the balance in Germany's favor). Throw in U.S. power and the "bare preponderance" of Allied power in Europe becomes overwhelming.

The U.S. contributions to World War II fell under three broad categories:

  1. Lend Lease Aid to key Allies such as Britain, the Soviet Union and China.
  2. Fighting Germany's allies, Japan and Italy
  3. Introduction of U.S. air and ground forces into western Europe.

In the 1945 book, the main U.S. contribution to the war was the defeat of Japan (with China becoming a "third world" power aligned neither with the United States nor Nazi Germany). That was basically a minimum condition for American survival.

The hypothesis from my unpublished World War II book "Axis Overstretch" is that the Axis win if they ever obtain control of 50% or more of the world's industrial capacity. According to Paul Kennedy's "Imperial Overstretch," North and South America had just under 45% of the world's industrial capacity in the 1940s. Add Australia, Japan and the latter's holdings in the ASEAN nations of Southeast Asia, and you get just over 50% for the U.S.-led bloc.

The 1945 book presupposed the failure of American Lend Lease aid and the resulting inability of America to protect Britain and the Soviet Union. In the "real" war, American Lend Lease aid approximated the total Axis output, thereby giving America's allies a bare preponderance of material against the Axis, which was enough for them to survive.

The introduction of American military forces in western Europe was the "icing on the cake," that sealed the fate of Nazi Germany. Even without this, the more pressing need was to ensure the survival of Britain and the Soviet Union, and the defeat of Japan. Britain and the Soviet Union had a preponderance of strength against Nazi Germany alone (the danger of U.S. non-intervention was that Japan would tip the balance in Germany's favor). Throw in U.S. power and the "bare preponderance" of Allied power in Europe becomes overwhelming.

2 added 119 characters in body
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The U.S. contributions to World War II fell under three broad categories:

1) Lend Lease Aid to key Allies such as Britain, the Soviet Union and China. 2) Fighting Germany's allies, Japan and Italy 3) Introduction of U.S. air and ground forces into western Europe.

  1. Lend Lease Aid to key Allies such as Britain, the Soviet Union and China.
  2. Fighting Germany's allies, Japan and Italy
  3. Introduction of U.S. air and ground forces into western Europe.

In the 1945 book, the main U.S. contribution to the war was the defeat of Japan (with China becoming a "third world" power aligned neither with the United States nor Nazi Germany). That was basically a minimum condition for American survival.

The hypothesis from my unpublished World War II book "Axis Overstretch" is that the Axis win if they obtain control of 50% or more of the world's industrial capaciycapacity. According to Paul Kennedy's "Imperial Overstretch," North and South America had just under 45% of the world's industrial capacity in the 1940s. Add Australia, Japan and the latter's holdings in the ASEAN nations of Southeast Asia, and you get just over 50% for the U.S.-led bloc.

The 1945 book presupposed the failure of American Lend Lease aid because of German submarine warfare (against Britain) and the unfortunate capture of Russia Baku, and the bulk of its oil reserves. In the "real" war, American Lend Lease aid approximated the total Axis output, thereby giving America's allies a bare preponderance of material against the Axis.

The introduction of American military forces in western Europe was the "icing on the cake," that sealed the fate of Nazi Germany. Even without this, the more pressing need was to ensure the survival of Britain and the Soviet Union, and the defeat of Japan. Britain and the Soviet Union had a bare preponderance of strength against Nazi Germany alone (the danger of U.S. non-intervention was that Japan would tip the balance in Germany's favor). Throw in U.S. power and the "bare preponderance" of Allied power in Europe becomes overwhelming.

The U.S. contributions to World War II fell under three broad categories:

1) Lend Lease Aid to key Allies such as Britain, the Soviet Union and China. 2) Fighting Germany's allies, Japan and Italy 3) Introduction of U.S. air and ground forces into western Europe.

In the 1945 book, the main U.S. contribution to the war was the defeat of Japan (with China becoming a "third world" power aligned neither with the United States nor Nazi Germany). That was basically a minimum condition for American survival.

The hypothesis from my unpublished World War II book "Axis Overstretch" is that the Axis win if they obtain control of 50% or more of the world's industrial capaciy. According to Paul Kennedy's "Imperial Overstretch," North and South America had just under 45% of the world's industrial capacity in the 1940s. Add Australia, Japan and the latter's holdings in the ASEAN nations of Southeast Asia, and you get just over 50%.

The 1945 book presupposed the failure of American Lend Lease aid because of German submarine warfare (against Britain) and the unfortunate capture of Russia Baku, and the bulk of its oil reserves. In the "real" war, American Lend Lease aid approximated the total Axis output, thereby giving America's allies a bare preponderance of material against the Axis.

The introduction of American military forces in western Europe was the "icing on the cake," that sealed the fate of Nazi Germany. Even without this, the more pressing need was to ensure the survival of Britain and the Soviet Union, and the defeat of Japan. Britain and the Soviet Union had a bare preponderance of strength against Nazi Germany alone (the danger of U.S. non-intervention was that Japan would tip the balance in Germany's favor).

The U.S. contributions to World War II fell under three broad categories:

  1. Lend Lease Aid to key Allies such as Britain, the Soviet Union and China.
  2. Fighting Germany's allies, Japan and Italy
  3. Introduction of U.S. air and ground forces into western Europe.

In the 1945 book, the main U.S. contribution to the war was the defeat of Japan (with China becoming a "third world" power aligned neither with the United States nor Nazi Germany). That was basically a minimum condition for American survival.

The hypothesis from my unpublished World War II book "Axis Overstretch" is that the Axis win if they obtain control of 50% or more of the world's industrial capacity. According to Paul Kennedy's "Imperial Overstretch," North and South America had just under 45% of the world's industrial capacity in the 1940s. Add Australia, Japan and the latter's holdings in the ASEAN nations of Southeast Asia, and you get just over 50% for the U.S.-led bloc.

The 1945 book presupposed the failure of American Lend Lease aid because of German submarine warfare (against Britain) and the unfortunate capture of Russia Baku, and the bulk of its oil reserves. In the "real" war, American Lend Lease aid approximated the total Axis output, thereby giving America's allies a bare preponderance of material against the Axis.

The introduction of American military forces in western Europe was the "icing on the cake," that sealed the fate of Nazi Germany. Even without this, the more pressing need was to ensure the survival of Britain and the Soviet Union, and the defeat of Japan. Britain and the Soviet Union had a bare preponderance of strength against Nazi Germany alone (the danger of U.S. non-intervention was that Japan would tip the balance in Germany's favor). Throw in U.S. power and the "bare preponderance" of Allied power in Europe becomes overwhelming.

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