The Stack Overflow podcast is back! Listen to an interview with our new CEO.
5 added 11 characters in body
source | link

But 500 transports for 30,000 1940s light infantry is in the ballpark of the 1000 transports for 17,000 men of two 1942 mechanized divisions.

But 500 transports for 30,000 1940s light infantry is in the ballpark of the 1000 transports for 17,000 1942 mechanized divisions.

But 500 transports for 30,000 1940s light infantry is in the ballpark of the 1000 transports for 17,000 men of two 1942 mechanized divisions.

4 edited body
source | link

Sea Lion had little chance of working. Everyone underestimated the complexity of a large scale amphibious invasion in 1940. The Germans considered Sea Lion to be like a river crossing on a broad front. The Americans were pushing for an invasion of Europe as early as 1942. The Allies had the luxury of learning the hard wasway through invasions of increasing scale from North Africa to Sicily to Italy before undertaking Overlord. Even then it barely worked out. Curiously, there was little liaison between the US forces in the Pacific and the invasion forces in Europe.

Sea Lion had little chance of working. Everyone underestimated the complexity of a large scale amphibious invasion in 1940. The Germans considered Sea Lion to be like a river crossing on a broad front. The Americans were pushing for an invasion of Europe as early as 1942. The Allies had the luxury of learning the hard was through invasions of increasing scale from North Africa to Sicily to Italy before undertaking Overlord. Even then it barely worked out. Curiously, there was little liaison between the US forces in the Pacific and the invasion forces in Europe.

Sea Lion had little chance of working. Everyone underestimated the complexity of a large scale amphibious invasion in 1940. The Germans considered Sea Lion to be like a river crossing on a broad front. The Americans were pushing for an invasion of Europe as early as 1942. The Allies had the luxury of learning the hard way through invasions of increasing scale from North Africa to Sicily to Italy before undertaking Overlord. Even then it barely worked out. Curiously, there was little liaison between the US forces in the Pacific and the invasion forces in Europe.

3 Update with information about Crete.
source | link

The Germans had no large scale amphibious experience, they didn't stand a chance.

You're asking three big questions. I'm going to focus on one, what could be supplied from the air, because the answer renders the other two moot.

How large an additional force, Y, would be necessary to complete the occupation? Put another way, what was the necessary sum of X+Y to defeat the British army?

A lot. Here is the German order of battle for Operation Sealion. I count 28 divisions, on the scale of the 6th Army at Stalingrad.

They planned on 11 infantry divisions plus 2 airborne in the first wave, 8 Panzer and motorized divisions in the second wave, and six infantry divisions in the third.

Would this be enough? Its within the ballpark of what the Allies found necessary in Normandy, and the Germans were good at planning land campaigns. It's a big question and I'm not going to get into detail because the answer to the final question renders it all moot.


How large a force X, was necessary to establish and maintain a beachhead that could only be resupplied and reinforced by air?

But 500 transports for 30,000 1940s light infantry is in the ballpark of the 1000 transports for 17,000 1942 mechanized divisions.

Now the second question.

Not a chance.

Even with the dilapidated state of the British Army, two divisions did not stand a chance against half a million British. Remember, this is the German army of 1940 fighting with Panzer Is, IIs and a few III and IVs. Two divisions is not just the beachhead, it is the maximum invasion force they can sustain. All while steadily losing transport aircraft to the RAF.


How large an additional force, Y, would be necessary to complete the occupation? Put another way, what was the necessary sum of X+Y to defeat the British army?

A lot. Here is the German order of battle for Operation Sealion. I count 28 divisions, on the scale of the 6th Army at Stalingrad. It's also within the ballpark of what the Allies found necessary in Normandy.

They planned on 11 infantry divisions plus 2 airborne in the first wave, 8 Panzer and motorized divisions in the second wave, and six infantry divisions in the third.

Even if the RAF was destroyed, there is no hope for Germany to supply thisan army by airlarge enough to defeat the British army and get off the beaches.

How large a force X, was necessary to establish and maintain a beachhead that could only be resupplied and reinforced by air?

Now the second question.

Even with the dilapidated state of the British Army, two divisions did not stand a chance against half a million British. Remember, this is the German army of 1940 fighting with Panzer Is, IIs and a few III and IVs. Two divisions is not just the beachhead, it is the maximum invasion force they can sustain. All while steadily losing transport aircraft to the RAF.


How large an additional force, Y, would be necessary to complete the occupation? Put another way, what was the necessary sum of X+Y to defeat the British army?

A lot. Here is the German order of battle for Operation Sealion. I count 28 divisions, on the scale of the 6th Army at Stalingrad. It's also within the ballpark of what the Allies found necessary in Normandy.

They planned on 11 infantry divisions plus 2 airborne in the first wave, 8 Panzer and motorized divisions in the second wave, and six infantry divisions in the third.

Even if the RAF was destroyed, there is no hope for Germany to supply this army by air.

The Germans had no large scale amphibious experience, they didn't stand a chance.

You're asking three big questions. I'm going to focus on one, what could be supplied from the air, because the answer renders the other two moot.

How large an additional force, Y, would be necessary to complete the occupation? Put another way, what was the necessary sum of X+Y to defeat the British army?

A lot. Here is the German order of battle for Operation Sealion. I count 28 divisions, on the scale of the 6th Army at Stalingrad.

They planned on 11 infantry divisions plus 2 airborne in the first wave, 8 Panzer and motorized divisions in the second wave, and six infantry divisions in the third.

Would this be enough? Its within the ballpark of what the Allies found necessary in Normandy, and the Germans were good at planning land campaigns. It's a big question and I'm not going to get into detail because the answer to the final question renders it all moot.


How large a force X, was necessary to establish and maintain a beachhead that could only be resupplied and reinforced by air?

But 500 transports for 30,000 1940s light infantry is in the ballpark of the 1000 transports for 17,000 1942 mechanized divisions.

Now the second question.

Not a chance.

Even with the dilapidated state of the British Army, two divisions did not stand a chance against half a million British. Remember, this is the German army of 1940 fighting with Panzer Is, IIs and a few III and IVs. Two divisions is not just the beachhead, it is the maximum invasion force they can sustain. All while steadily losing transport aircraft to the RAF.

Even if the RAF was destroyed, there is no hope for Germany to supply an army large enough to defeat the British army and get off the beaches.

2 Update with informationa about Crete.
source | link
1
source | link