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My understanding is that, after its 2008 invasion of Georgia and lackluster tactical performance, Russia critically examined a lot of its doctrine, equipment and troops. I assume some level of better training has followed, certainly procurement is known to have been focussed on.

How that will play out with training Pakistani forces is another story.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-military-clout/russia-raises-military-clout-with-reforms-after-georgian-war-idUSBREA1Q1YR20140227

More information in this PDF, training considerations are addressed near the end. But since this report came out only 2 yrs after Georgia, it's more in needs-to-be-done category than assessing what was done.

http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1069.pdf

Googling for "Russia military reforms after 2008 Georgia" should give you plenty of reading material.

As to the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, certainly the USSR had a number of deficiencies in its operations there, and training would likely have been a major one (training and morale are huge and often overlooked military factors). But better training, on its own or even with better equipment, would probably not have succeeded in imposing a foreign mode of government on Afghanis, as 17 years of NATO efforts without clear success to date demonstrates.

Last, Russia military organization (inherited from USSR) apparently doesn't give put emphasis on the NCO component. Western armies have privates - NCOs - Officers and professional. NCO, esp older and veteran , contribute significantly to tactical military effectiveness when both privates and frontline officers (Lt, Cpt) can be expected to be quite young.

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/personnel-nco.htm

My understanding is that, after its 2008 invasion of Georgia and lackluster tactical performance, Russia critically examined a lot of its doctrine, equipment and troops. I assume some level of better training has followed, certainly procurement is known to have been focussed on.

How that will play out with training Pakistani forces is another story.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-military-clout/russia-raises-military-clout-with-reforms-after-georgian-war-idUSBREA1Q1YR20140227

More information in this PDF, training considerations are addressed near the end. But since this report came out only 2 yrs after Georgia, it's more in needs-to-be-done category than assessing what was done.

http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1069.pdf

Googling for "Russia military reforms after 2008 Georgia" should give you plenty of reading material.

As to the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, certainly the USSR had a number of deficiencies in its operations there, and training would likely have been a major one (training and morale are huge and often overlooked military factors). But better training, on its own or even with better equipment, would probably not have succeeded in imposing a foreign mode of government on Afghanis, as 17 years of NATO efforts without clear success to date demonstrates.

Last, Russia military organization (inherited from USSR) apparently doesn't give put emphasis on the NCO component. Western armies have privates - NCOs - Officers. NCO, being older and often veterans, contribute significantly to tactical military effectiveness when both privates and frontline officers (Lt, Cpt) can be expected to be quite young.

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/personnel-nco.htm

My understanding is that, after its 2008 invasion of Georgia and lackluster tactical performance, Russia critically examined a lot of its doctrine, equipment and troops. I assume some level of better training has followed, certainly procurement is known to have been focussed on.

How that will play out with training Pakistani forces is another story.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-military-clout/russia-raises-military-clout-with-reforms-after-georgian-war-idUSBREA1Q1YR20140227

More information in this PDF, training considerations are addressed near the end. But since this report came out only 2 yrs after Georgia, it's more in needs-to-be-done category than assessing what was done.

http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1069.pdf

Googling for "Russia military reforms after 2008 Georgia" should give you plenty of reading material.

As to the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, certainly the USSR had a number of deficiencies in its operations there, and training would likely have been a major one (training and morale are huge and often overlooked military factors). But better training, on its own or even with better equipment, would probably not have succeeded in imposing a foreign mode of government on Afghanis, as 17 years of NATO efforts without clear success to date demonstrates.

My understanding is that, after its 2008 invasion of Georgia and lackluster tactical performance, Russia critically examined a lot of its doctrine, equipment and troops. I assume some level of better training has followed, certainly procurement is known to have been focussed on.

How that will play out with training Pakistani forces is another story.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-military-clout/russia-raises-military-clout-with-reforms-after-georgian-war-idUSBREA1Q1YR20140227

More information in this PDF, training considerations are addressed near the end. But since this report came out only 2 yrs after Georgia, it's more in needs-to-be-done category than assessing what was done.

http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1069.pdf

Googling for "Russia military reforms after 2008 Georgia" should give you plenty of reading material.

As to the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, certainly the USSR had a number of deficiencies in its operations there, and training would likely have been a major one (training and morale are huge and often overlooked military factors). But better training, on its own or even with better equipment, would probably not have succeeded in imposing a foreign mode of government on Afghanis, as 17 years of NATO efforts without clear success to date demonstrates.

Last, Russia military organization (inherited from USSR) apparently doesn't give put emphasis on the NCO component. Western armies have privates - NCOs - Officers and professional. NCO, esp older and veteran , contribute significantly to tactical military effectiveness when both privates and frontline officers (Lt, Cpt) can be expected to be quite young.

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/personnel-nco.htm

My understanding is that, after its 2008 invasion of Georgia and lackluster tactical performance, Russia critically examined a lot of its doctrine, equipment and troops. I assume some level of better training has followed, certainly procurement is known to have been focussed on.

How that will play out with training Pakistani forces is another story.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-military-clout/russia-raises-military-clout-with-reforms-after-georgian-war-idUSBREA1Q1YR20140227

More information in this PDF, training considerations are addressed near the end. But since this report came out only 2 yrs after Georgia, it's more in needs-to-be-done category than assessing what was done.

http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1069.pdf

Googling for "Russia military reforms after 2008 Georgia" should give you plenty of reading material.

My understanding is that, after its 2008 invasion of Georgia and lackluster tactical performance, Russia critically examined a lot of its doctrine, equipment and troops. I assume some level of better training has followed, certainly procurement is known to have been focussed on.

How that will play out with training Pakistani forces is another story.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-military-clout/russia-raises-military-clout-with-reforms-after-georgian-war-idUSBREA1Q1YR20140227

More information in this PDF, training considerations are addressed near the end. But since this report came out only 2 yrs after Georgia, it's more in needs-to-be-done category than assessing what was done.

http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1069.pdf

Googling for "Russia military reforms after 2008 Georgia" should give you plenty of reading material.

As to the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, certainly the USSR had a number of deficiencies in its operations there, and training would likely have been a major one (training and morale are huge and often overlooked military factors). But better training, on its own or even with better equipment, would probably not have succeeded in imposing a foreign mode of government on Afghanis, as 17 years of NATO efforts without clear success to date demonstrates.