Did the Nazis have any unique or especially effective economic policies?

Question

The Nazi rule in Germany is associated with (among many, many other things) a sudden and powerful economic resurgence. This is especially impressive since it happened in a country that was practically the definition of economic hell during the 1920s, and because it happened around the same time that the economies of many other countries (such as the United States) was being utterly devastated by the Great Depression. (In fact, the economic turnaround was so striking that even 20 years later, it would inspire an episode of Star Trek.)

I've always understood that this had mostly to do with inspiring the population, getting their passions up, and applying a little of that German efficiency once again. Hitler was nothing if not motivating, and the first thing that anyone learns about the Nazis was their (oftentimes terrifying) ability to mobilize large groups of people toward a single goal.

But it's worth asking, did the Nazis do anything specific to stimulate their economy during this time? Was there an economic wunderkind among the Nazi leadership, or some new economic doctrine associated with the Nazi regime that was especially effective? Or was it really just a matter of passion and discipline, and a will to return to the greatness that was Germany?

Answer 1

I wouldn't call it "unique," but Hitler adopted the "Keynesian" prescription of "pump-priming" a depressed economy through government spending. Even if it was for military spending (which to Hitler, was a form of "investment.")

This started in 1933-34, and pre-dated Keynes' 1936 tome, "A General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money." This gave Nazi Germany an economic "head start" of several years over the Allies: France, England, and America.

Answer 2

There was an economic wunderkind of sorts. The economist and Reichsbank president Hjamlman Schacht was an early Nazi supporter, though never a major figure in the party. He managed to stabilize Weimar inflation by issuing bonds based on shares of "land," which he claimed had an instinctive, stabilizing appeal. He was also a compelling figure with high contacts in industry and world banking. When his secretary was asked what exactly he did to stabilize the currency and partly resolve the crisis, she said: "Nothing, he just smoked cigars and talked on the phone."