Yes it was. While neutralizing or bypassing Stalingrad may been a good idea, capturing it was a colossal waste of resources. The original, achievable German plan did not feature crossing the Volga. The main German attack was in the opposite direction, to the south.
The original goal of Case Blue was the capture of the Caucus oilfields which Germany desperately needed to conduct a mobile war as Romanian supplies dwindled. Fourth and Sixth Panzer Army were to anchor the northern flank by reaching the Don and Volga rivers, cutting off the Caucus region. Once that task was complete, First and Seventeenth Armies would attack the troops now cut off in the Caucuses. The capture of Stalingrad was not deemed necessary, the Germans did not plan to advance past the Volga that year. This was an achievable goal within the limits of German supply and manpower and the area's logistics.
The Germans forgot their strategic objectives and the capture of Stalingrad took on a mythical propaganda value for both sides. It took a very mobile army and subjected it to grinding siege warfare. They should have stuck to the plan of holding the Soviets at the Don/Volga line while their mobile forces ran amok capturing oilfields and resources. This also would have cut off the Soviet army in the Caucuses in another grand encirclement (though it could still be supplied via Lend-Lease) and considerably shortened German lines. Refueled with Soviet oil, 1943 may have seen a grand pincer movement on Moscow.
Hitler's constant amateur meddling in the southern front resulted in confused logistics. This would often kill the momentum of successful attacks while the Germans sorted out their units and allowed the Soviets time to regroup. The transport in the area simply couldn't support transferring whole armies from one front to another, but the inexperienced Hitler did not understand this from pushing flags around a map.
The biggest blunder was Hitler splitting Army Group South into Army Group A and B and sending them off on different objectives simultaneously. Hitler (again) greatly underestimated the strength and reserves of the Soviet armies. Not only could the new armies groups not support each other, they had to kill their momentum to sort themselves out, and now had two armies taxing the area's logistics.
The strategic mistakes made by Hitler on the Southern Front are well covered by the Wikipedia page on Case Blue. Changing objectives, splitting armies disbursing their power, overconfidence, overstrained logistics... it all lead to slowing and diffusing the, until then, very successful German army advance into southern Russia. Had Hitler not meddled and clogged the roads with his own vehicles, Stalingrad may have been taken in July before the Soviets were able to regroup.
I don't have a reading recommendation specifically for Case Blue, I would recommend "Enemy At The Gates: The Battle for Stalingrad" by William Craig. It's more about the siege itself than the surrounding mistakes of Case Blue, and more from the Soviet perspective, it is an excellent read and William Craig does an excellent job of telling history through personal stories. Ignore the movie (or, at least, realize it has little to do with history).