I should note that this is referring to the period of 1922 and 1923, as shown by this quote:
"In the
popular mind, devaluation was inseparably connected with the experi-
ence of hyperinflation. In 1922 and 1923 the plummeting value of the
Reichsmark against the dollar had been the daily index of German
misery." Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The
Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (London: Allen Lane, 2006), 21
I actually had a large amount written on how the German currency didn't crash at the end of the 1920s, when this actually refers to the beginning of the 1920s, as later economic problems in Germany were actually caused by the German Government's refusal to devalue the currency. (Tooze, 21)
Now, I primarily have information on the mid-late 1920s and 1930s, so I'll give that:
During the 1920s and even moreso in the 1930s Germany was primarily an importer of goods:
"...between October 1925 and the end of 1928 the inflow of foreign
capital was so large that Germany could make its reparations payments
without even having to earn a surplus on its trade account. This was
convenient for the British and French since it enabled them to insist
on German payments without having to open their markets to billions of
Goldmarks' worth of goods." Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The
Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (London: Allen Lane, 2006), 6
At the start of the great depression, Germany actually had a trade surplus:
"A trade deficit of 2.9 billion Reichsmarks in 1928 was, by 1931, turned into a trade surplus of 2.8 billion Reichsmarks (see Appendix, Table A1)." Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (London: Allen Lane, 2006), 17
However, it should be noted that
"This surplus, however, resulted not from rising exports but from the fact that due to the Depression, demand for foreign imports fell even more rapidly than German sales abroad. As factories shut down, and the blight of joblessness and poverty spread across German society, demand for foreign raw materials and consumer goods plummeted." Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction: The
Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (London: Allen Lane, 2006), 17
We can rule out Germany exporting certain things, by references to what it had to import: Raw materials. Germany needed to import most raw materials, even food. (Tooze, 50, 73) In fact, Tooze notes that "The one resource that Germany did have in abundance was coal." (Tooze, 50)
This leaves manufacturing, which was in fact Germanies main export; It turned raw materials into goods for other nations:
"The livelihood of
thousands of firms and millions of workers depended on finding custtomers abroad. The light manufacturing districts of central and eastern
Germany, the great commercial cities of the Rhine valley, the port towns
of the Baltic and the North Sea all earned their living through foreign
trade." Tooze, 72
If you want things more specific you could look up the products of the leading German exporters:
"As he repeatedly made clear, he counted on the export power
and financial muscle of companies like Siemens, AEG, IG Farben and
the Vereinigte Stahlwerke." Tooze, 104
I can tell you that IG Farben was the worlds largest chemical company, and was a leader in polymers and synthetics, as well as just about every other chemical field.
Krupp was another major company in Germany, and was the second largest steel producer in the world (Tooze, 120)
Tooze also mentions that within Germany "the bulk production of commodities
ranging from textile dyes to pharmaceuticals, sheet metal and light
bulbs." is ongoing (Tooze, 139), and I happen to know from background knowledge that until WWII Germany is the only nation that knows how to produce tungsten-filament light-bulbs, a technology that had to be reverse engineered by the Allies in WWII, as tungsten-filaments are a critical component of vacuum tubes, which were needed for radios and anything else with a transistor.
Tooze also mentions that "One step down from these corporate giants, there were literally
hundreds of smaller mass-producers in Germany, making everything
from screws to gas lamps and harmonicas." (Tooze, 139)
I hope this helps, though most of it assumes that the focus of the German economy didn't change between the 1920s and 1930s.
