What's the advantage of the infantry column formation in the Napoleonic Wars?

Question

In movies/books set in the Napoleonic Wars, the British are normally deployed into lines and the French into columns. The columns are usually the advancing ones, charging into the line as the line hold their ground and fire volleys at the advancing column. In the movies it's always depicted that this situation benefits the British, because they outshoot the column (the whole line can shoot vs just the front rank or the outer edge of the column), and they don't have to move (meaning they can reload easily and faster). Not to mention that it seems scarier to be in the front rank of a column.

The result is normally the French getting slaughtered before they even reach the line, or when they arrive they would be so outnumbered that it becomes an unbalanced melee. Well, to be fair of course English-speaking movies tend to show British victories.

Actual history reading seems to confirm that the French indeed liked fighting in columns, but why did they do this when it seems obvious that the line is more advantageous? The only advantage I can think is probably faster speed (because less files to harmonize), but I don't think this justifies the greatly reduced firepower.

And why is it in the movies the French seems to be the one attacking and the British standing their ground? How would the French deploy if they're the defending side? Is there a good example of a French victory using this kind of setting?

Answer 1

What you are referring to is commonly known as the "French Column". I suppose it shouldn't be surprising that English movies and the English version of Wikipedia are pretty dismissive of it. After all, that was the opinion of everyone's favorite English General, Wellington. And he was certainly able to back it up.

The first thing you have to realize is that Napoleonic-era unit tactics were not all about math. Getting the maximum possible fire on your opponent is important, but it isn't the only factor.

The greatest goal is to remove the enemy units from action. Now a unit (regiment, battalion, etc) obviously can be removed from action without killing every single person in that unit. How bad do you have to hurt them? That depends on oodles of factors (eg: training, experience, casualties, etc) that are often wound up into a big ball called "morale".

So a lot of Napoleanic-era tactics that may not make a lot of sense mathematically make a lot of sense when you factor in morale. For instance, the volley. Mathematically you'd be better off letting every man fire as fast as he possibly can, rather than making them all wait on a signal. However, there's a huge difference to the opposing unit whether your buddies around you are dying in dribs and drabs here and there, or in great big groups all at once. Volleys hit like a hammer rather than a steady rain.

The idea behind a French Column isn't to pour a lot of fire into the opposing unit. Instead, it is to concentrate the entire efforts of your unit into a small area (usually in the middle) of the enemy unit. The folks in the rest of the enemy unit may feel safer, but anyone at the point of impact looking at an entire French Column 50 or so men wide and hundreds deep making a beeline straight at their part of the line has a pretty good idea they are gonna die. A sensible human being (aka: all but the incredibly well-trained) looking at that will do whatever they can to get out of the way.

If you can break the enemy line there, you break their unit in two. If you then keep coming, you will suddenly have your whole unit in the middle of theirs, able to fire on all of them effectively in a line while they have found themselves in a column (assuming they don't just rout). The key to being able to do this is training and speed, and early on nobody could match Napoleon in these two qualities. It was almost like a Calvary charge for him, but done with infantry.

Here's a passage taken from a fan of the formation in Eric Flint's 1824: The Arkansas War (a work of alternative history):

The term "column" was a misnomer, he now realized, applied to the fighting formation of the French armies of the Revolution. This bore no resemblance at all to a long, slender line of men marching down a road.

It was more like a sledgehammer. Or perhaps a very blunt spear. Fifty men across, at the front, firing as they came, with the rest of the regiment in close support. The formation relied on speed and impact, more like a cavalry charge than anything else Sam could think of.

Watching it in action, he could now understand why the formation had eventually been abandoned. Very well trained and disciplined professional armies, formed into lines, could bring too much fire to bear on the front of the column. Hundreds of men against fifty.

But that presupposed the sort of professional armies trained and led by generals like the Duke of Wellington...

Answer 2

Napoleon loved forward momentum - and he got it with the heavy column. The formation forced his infantry forward, the front ranks constantly pushed to the fore by the ranks behind them, and made opponents break formation to get the hell out of the way. This worked, because Napoleon was an artilleryman - he would disrupt opposing line formations with artillery barrage and cavalry, and once an infantry column broke through, it was all but over for the opposing forces. Napoleon's genius was knowing the soft spot to send his columns towards, and how to best support the attack.

Bear in mind that the "attack column" wasn't like a marching column or even an infantry square. The peleton, which translates as "platoon" or "rank", was either 80 men wide and 9 deep, or 40 men wide and 18 deep, and was the base unit of maneuver. So look at it more as successive waves of dense line formations. Once they're through the opposing line, peletons can wheel right or left to deliver flanking fire.

Wellington went with a much thinner line, and relied on carefully chosen terrain, cavalry and counter-artillery to disrupt French artillery support. Retreat and redeploy was a common British tactic, changing the shape of the line, bending but never breaking. The British are never shown as retreating in historical fiction because they're supposed to be the "Good Guys" in most english-language media - nevertheless C.S. Forrester had a fantastic depiction of a typical British retreat, organized and in good order while under heavy fire, in his Hornblower series. (Marines rather than infantry, but you get a good idea how this was drilled and practiced.) The other trick was to break French discipline with a two-volleys-and-bayonet-charge drill which caused the front of the attack column to break ranks, to rush to engage the enemy, which left them helpless to respond to flanking fire and too disorganized to take advantage of their break-through or allow the rest of the column to engage.

Answer 3

The first thing to remember is that Napoleon prized speed over everything else. Most of his campaigns he faced much larger armies led by different nations and leaders. When Napoleon arrived the opposing armies would be near one another but not yet (His apposing armies were separated due to forage and supply needs, or were traveling to meet one another at a rally point.) Napoleon would then force march his army to meet one of these separated enemy armies. Once he arrived there he needed to attack and destroy that army immediately before the other allied army could bring reinforcements and overwhelm him. He did this in such battles as Montenotte, Ulm, Jena, Ligny (the battle before Waterloo).

Once he got on the battle field he usually attacked the center of the enemy, his troops advancing in the French column. This allowed the troops to move more quickly only pausing a moment to slightly widen and then continue to march forward. They didn’t have to pause to redress their lines at any point. There is a great web site that explains it better than I can. http://www.napolun.com/mirror/napoleonistyka.atspace.com/infantry_tactics_4.htm But as others have said the intent of the French column was to hit the center with a hammer blow.

The third thing to remember is that Napoleon’s armies were international and not very well trained. The French didn’t spend the time the British did to train troops to fire 3 shots a second. They didn’t train for months to perfect the complicated maneuvers needed to go from column to line under fire and under speed. According to La Grande Armee by Blond in 1809 the Grande Armee numbered 350,000 troops, 80% of which were French troops. By 1812 the 400,000 Grande Armee only 33% of them were French soldiers. Some of these troops, and officers did not even speak French. It would be too difficult to give multiple complicated orders versus just saying see their center go right for it as fast as you can. The British could train their troops so thoroughly because their army was so small; which is why it needed to be as tough as it could be. The French also could not afford to waste powder by constantly training them how to fire faster. Napoleon on the other hand knew he had a much larger man power base than any other single country; he could afford to waste his soldiers for a victory.

Some people would say this shows the genius of Wellington to use his men to the maximum of their ability; and Napoleon lacked genius because he was so willing to sacrifice them. To me it says that both of them realized their own situation and tried to maximize it as best as they could. Napoleon believed in speed, Wellington in terrain. I had also wondered why the French used the column attack, and I spent a lot of time researching different ideas on it. But speed and undertrained and international army seemed to be the most common answer to why the column was used.

Answer 4

Columns are an aggressive formation, that work best against "inferior" (slower-firing, -marching) opponents. That's because at the point of contact, the column is very deep, which means that it has a good chance of breaking the enemy line. It's weakness is that against a well-drilled opponent, the defender will pull back the line on either side, let the attacker go through, and then slaughter the column with fire from both sides.

Most of Napoleon's opponents had inferior armies. The main exception was the British army, which was exceptionally well-drilled, and could not only deploy in line, but "refuse the line" (the standard anti-column defense used at e.g. Little Round Top by the North at Gettysburg), and form squares (against cavalry).

That's why British armies under the likes of Wellington could defeat equal or greater numbers of Frenchmen, while other countries' armies needed a superiority of numbers.

There are few inherent advantages to lines versus columns; it's all a matter of execution. Ultimately, the British executed better than the French, while others did not, which is why British lines distinguished themselves against French columns.

Answer 5

When will this myth dies its long deserved death? It is based on the blind following of Sir Charles Oman's mistaken interpretation of French tactics, arising from a misunderstanding of contemporary accounts of the Battle of Maida. You all need to read A Reappraisal of Column Versus Line in the Peninsular War by James Arnold.

The true French battle formation in the Napoleonic Wars was skirmish order, and it is with its disciplined artillery and hordes of skirmishers that the French pummelled the lines of Austrian, Prussian and Russian troops for 20 years, softening them up for a hammer blow by reserve infantry and heavy cavalry that would punch a hole through the lines and unleash a torrent of pursuit by the likes of LaSalle and Montbrun. It is noteworthy that the only other nation to train and deploy skirmishers in similar quantity and quality to the French was the British under Wellington.

The Column, whether by company or division, was a maneuver formation, which wheeled and formed (hollow) square up to 3 times faster than a line (French regulations of 1791 gave respectively 30 sec. and 100 sec. for forming square). In emergency a masse or closed-column square could often be formed even faster to defend against cavalry, a maneuver favoured by the Austrians, Prussians and Russians from their experience against the nomadic horsemen of the steppe.

For the bulk of Napoleonic battles in which they fought the French were the attacker, and hence maneuvered in column prior to deploying and giving combat. Those on the defence, without the requirement to maneuver, have the luxury of waiting in line for the assault. As noted in James Arnold's series the intent was always to deploy into line before contact (except as a coup de main), though this sometimes failed in execution.

Update - Excerpts from A Reappraisal of Column versus Line in the Peninsular War by James R. Arnold's:

Part 1: - Introduction -

However, an examination of primary source information demonstrates that, in both general and specific ways, Oman's understanding of French tactical method was flawed.

Part 2 - Oman's Thesis:

.... Least there be any doubt about Soult's maneuvers [taking Pratzen Heights during Austerlitz], the deployment into line is observed and recorded by Karl Stutterheim, an Austrian eyewitness. Thus, contrary to Oman, the spearhead of Napoleon's 'battle stroke', at the Emperor's most celebrated battle, fights the decisive action in line.

.... Throughout the Ratisbon phase of the 1809 campaign, the French made extensive use of massed skirmisher tactics.

.... In and of themselves these examples are not of surpassing historical importance. Skirmish order was merely one available formation that French commanders could select from the tactical tool box. However, the fact that the French were routinely capable of deploying entire units into skirmish order challenges Oman's expertise in French small unit tactics.

Part 3 - The Battle of Maida: Building a Tactical Edifice:

.... His basic misunderstandings probably stem from his initial treatment of the Battle of Maida. ....

Oman first dealt with Maida in a lecture given in 1907 to the Royal Artillery Institution. In this talk he attributed the French defeat to the inherent difficulty of a column formation assaulting a linear one. Speaking of the decisive clash between the 1st Légère and the British Light Battalion, he said:

"It was the fairest fight between column and line that had been seen since the Napoleonic wars began -- on the one side two heavy columns of 800 men each, drawn up in column of companies...The front of each was not more than sixty yards. Kempt, on the other hand, has his battalion in line...every one of them could use his musket against either the front or flank of one of the two French columns."

....

Oman partially recognized his error by 1912. In a footnote to his Wellington's Army he wrote:

"Till lately I had supposed that Reynier had at least his left wing...in columns of battalions, but evidence put before me seems to prove that despite the fact the French narratives do not show it, the majority at least of Renyier's men were deployed".

....

In addition, contrary to Oman's claim about the lack of French documentation, two French participants strongly support the notion of a French advance in line. A French artillery lieutenant named Griois wrote, "General Reynier gave the order to advance to engage the enemy, and to accomplish this to form on the left in line".[41] Moreoever, there is Reynier's account of the battle, a source of information that Oman really should not have overlooked. In a letter written the day after the battle, Reynier relates how "The 1st and 42nd regiments, 2,400 strong...passed the Lamato and formed into line with the left on the Lamato".

Part 4 - The Peninsular War:

.... Oman wrote the first volumes of his Peninsular War history while still supremely confident about his tactical understanding.

Part 5 - Oman and Historiography:

Meanwhile, another [David Chandler being the first] Sandhurst historian, Paddy Griffith, had also read my critique of Oman while developing his own ideas. Griffith concurred about French tactical flexibility while arguing persuasively that the British did not simply stand in line and fire volleys to win out, but rather swept the field by firing and then conducting a bayonet charge.[74] By 1998 a new paradigm seemed to have set in with the publication of two books devoted to Napoleonic battle tactics.[75] Both claimed that the French fought in line at Maida and both fully explored French tactical variety. The 2002 publication of The Battle of Maida 1806: Fifteen Minutes of Glory, appeared to have brought the issue of column versus line to a satisfactory conclusion: "The contemporary sources are...the best evidence and their conclusion is clear: General Compère's brigade formed into line to attack Kempt's Light Battalion." The decisive action at Maida took place in less than fifteen minutes. It had taken 72 years to rectify a great historian's error about what transpired during those minutes.

Answer 6

There are few things I would point out that seem to have been missed in earlier responses. The French infantry battalion was generally composed of 6 companies; four center companies and one each of grenadiers and voltigeurs. The French regiment or demi-brigade in the early period usually had three battalions, and there were two regiments per brigade, though organization changed somewhat over the years.

The French attack column was called "colonne de battalion par division" In this formation two center companies were up front in line, two more behind, with the grenadiers formed up on the right of the front right hand company and the voltiguers either on the left, or up in front acting as a skirmish screen. Three battalions or a demi-brigade , properly spaced to allow formation changes could thus advance more quickly then if formed in line. As they got closer to the enemy, they frequently reformed to something called "Ordre Mixte." In this formation, the center battalion would form a line, with all of its companies side by side, three ranks deep, while the other two battalions would keep their column formations with the skirmishing voltigeurs now forming up on their respective battalions left flanks.

This provided a regimental frontage of 14 companies (out of 18). This formation was therefore more linear than columnar. A common practice was that once within musket range, all 14 companies would fire a volley. At this point, either the whole regiment might be ordered forward in the charge, or sometimes the center battalion in line would remain in line and continue firing as the other two charged.

These tactics actually evolved from the French Revolutionary wars specifically as a method by which large numbers of less-trained troops could crush the linear formations of highly drilled long service veterans. It was very effective, particularly with preparatory bombardment by the well-organized French artillery. The only opposing army that NOT to eventually adopt similar tactics were the British, but the ONE and only truly great general produced by England at this time was the Duke of Wellington. Wellington, was head and shoulders above in ability over any other allied commander in the Napoleonic period,and very careful to deploy his infantry on the reverse slopes of hills to shield them from observation and French Artillery, and trained one man in five in his army to serve as skirmish troops.

The other thing that's missing is that Napoleon was a master of the use of combined arms. It was not at all uncommon for Napoleon or his generals to gallop a battery of horse artillery forward, to within say about 200 yards of an enemy line,well ahead of his infantry, and at which range the musket was all but useless against a dispersed target like a battery in line but the battery could wreak havoc on the formed infantry. Then that nasty French demi-brigade would come up...

Again, this would not have worked very well against troops deployed on a reverse slope, but the Wellington seems to have been the main proponent of the reverse slope defense, and there was only one Wellington.

Answer 7

You have to be very careful about films about the Napoleonic Wars. First off, there aren't that many, unless you include the Richard Sharpe made for TV series and various TV miniseries, about which I will speak later.

Of the actual feature films, I think War And Peace has been made twice, the only one worth watching being the Bondarchuk version. Bondarchuk also directed Waterloo, which though accurate to a point, contained many of the myths and fallacies endemic of British histories of the battle. This owes much to nonsense written about the battle by Capt William Siborne, who was not present for it but relied on heavily on accounts provided by officers to whom he was personally indebted for substantial amounts of money. Siborne's work was heavily used by Charles Oman, whose work was even more anglo-centric in nature and a lot of fallacies make their way into the popular history. In the film Waterloo for instance, when Drouet d'Erlon's corps attacks the allied line, Wellington is heard to remark "They're coming at us in the same old way," to which Picton replies "Then we'll have to greet them in the same old way."

All nice, but it's historical nonsense of the first order. d'Erlon's corps did not advance in the "same old way" meaning meaning "colonne de bataillon par division," or the standard French battalion column. They advanced in in a rarely used formation dating back to the French Revolutionary wars knows as "colonne de division par bataillon." In this formation, all eight battallions in the division were formed in line 3 deep, with one battalion behind the the other, giving the division a frontage of approximately 200 men, 24 ranks deep. The difficulty of repelling cavalry in this formation has much to do with the the chaos caused by Uxbridge's timely charge with two brigades of British heavies, but prior to this event, they came quite close to crumpling up the left of Wellington's line.

Siborne had access to this information but didn't understand the difference between "colonne de division par bataillon" and "colonne de bataillon par division," so in his history, and most everything British that followed, the French simply advanced in the "same old way."

Making films about Napoleonic battles is expensive. Thousands of extras are needed, not to mention horses, colorful uniforms and artillery. The battle sequences are difficult to film. Not to mention that the interest in the North American (the most lucrative) market is limited since Americans weren't involved. Waterloo was a box office failure. When "Master and Commander: The Far Side Of the World" a naval film of the same era was made, the enemy had to be changed from the Americans as in the book, to French, else it would never sell in America.

The TV miniseries are just that; soap operas about Napoleon and Josephine, often with battle segments stolen from feature films and plonked in. The Sharpe TV movies are comparatively low-budget affairs, without the money most of the time to properly depict the battles described in the books. Further, Bernard Cornwell who wrote the books, is as completely Anglo-centric in his views as Siborne and Oman, and his work contains many of the same mistakes or fallacies.

As I have previously posted, the French tactical system was a flexible one that made extensive use of combined arms and out of necessity during the Wars of the French Revolution. The problems that French commanders faced in this period was that while they could field large numbers of men making heavy use of conscription, these men lacked the training and tight discipline of the long-service armies of their enemies, which were still being trained and disciplined to 18thC standards. The tactical system that evolved, was one that relied on combined arms, "élan" (momentum), permanent divisions and the evolution of the army corps, and finally, commanders promoted up through proven ability rather than by aristocratic birth or purchase of commissions.

The system worked well enough for the French to stomp all over the other armies of Europe who used linear tactics and smaller, long service armies. Pretty much all of the armies in Europe, save the British and Portuguese who were British trained, eventually adopted or copied the French organization, though they continued to promote commanders based on things other than ability.

Finally, I will add that while the British who continued to use linear tactics were an important participant in the Napoleonic Wars in terms of their naval and financial contributions, they were a very minor player on land. Wellington, the only British army commander to have much success, never had many troops available to him in Portugal and Spain and even at Waterloo, only one third of his 75,000 men were British.

Answer 8

Speed with greater numbers and fear is the primary answer here.

The marching columns main purpose was to simply get to the enemy as fast as possible and overwhelm them with superior numbers. The huge columns of soldiers marching to a rhythmic drumbeat would strike fear into the hearts of any opponent. The high casualty rate of this kind of tactic was justified by the speed of victory and was less significant for the French due to their superior numbers.

Bottom line - it was a sledge hammmer to crack a nut.

This of course didn't work particularly well against the British, despite their inferior numbers, due to their far higher discipline and better training (they didn't break and run so easily) and their greater volley firing rate.

All British redcoats could fire 3 musket balls a minute - far better than any other army.

Answer 9

I think the better answer would come from asking why the French Columns failed in Spain whereas they were spectacularly successful everywhere else save Russia where infantry just doesn't matter too much.

I can't say I know the answer to the question "why did the French get mauled in Spain" but certainly when you're moving in a series of columns the "will to attack" can be and indeed was overwhelming...which of course is exactly what Napoleon wanted and indeed got...again and again and again...defeating entire Armies in the field and then marching into completely undefended Cities...looting, pillaging, taking liberties with the women, etc.

In Spain the Spaniards seldom came out to attack the French "formally" and ominously the terrain "created" single file lines so my understanding at least is that the French were "sitting ducks" in Spain until at least they could get formed up...much as the English were in New England during the American "Revolutionary War."

Eventually the losses for Napoleonic France were to great to "hold Spain" and the French were forced to withdraw.

This opened the door to Great Britain and Wellington who "cut his teeth" in Spain I believe (the Peninsular Campaigns.)

Of course defeating Napoleon and defeating France were two different things entirely.

It's not like Wellington was marching around Paris waving the Union Jack either...

Answer 10

Napoleonic wars key final were Spain and Russia. Napoleon was so confident that he has enough army to conquer europe that he never expected that he will be defeated in these countries and start his retreat into France. Napoleon angried whole Europe provocking a big coalition against him and with it the surrender of France.

In Spain, he thought that Spanish people will support him, however, he provocked a rebellion against him. Napoleon only cut the head of Spanish government and kidnapped the king of in order to force Spain to be loyal to him. In few years, the 118.000 French men were flooded. However, Spanish army and militia was not well coordinated, it was without a commander. Therefore, the arrive of Wellingtom on the key moment. Napoleon decided to help his brother sending 500.000 soldiers of reinforcements. At that moment, Cadiz´s exile government gave Wellingtom the title of Generallisimo (maybe you know this title because it was the same title of General Franco). The british&portuguese army was outnumbered in compare with the Grand Armee, however, Spain´s total mobilization (800.000 men) joined them. Once Wellingtom, meet whole army went direct against French army and Napoleon plan to recover the controll of the peninsula was frustrated. The war in Peninsula was hard but Spain recover whole territory.

In Russia, the winter and the vast territory was his downfull. He destroyed his own army.

At the end, the grand coalition surplused the Grand armee and France was sieged from all his frontiers. Wellingtom experience in Peninsular war gave the chance to defeat Napoleon in waterloo.

UK, at the sea, was enough to defeat France, however, at land, was really impossible, so he needed a coalition of countries to defeat him. The infantry formation is not enough if you dont have enough men to defeat the rival. The grand armee was 7 times bigger than British army.