One point which has not been mentioned yet... it has been alleged that Soviet industry provided export versions of hardware (tanks, etc) referred to as 'monkey models' which were inferior to the variants issued to Soviet troops proper.
The first use of the term is credited to Vladimir Bogdanovich Rezun (pen name 'Viktor Suvorov'), a Soviet intelligence officer who defected to the west. He mentions this in his 1982 book 'Inside the Soviet Army'.
Soviet export models were simpler for many reasons, principally: to reduce cost, to increase mass production, to provide western intelligence with disinformation on Soviet capability, and to enable Soviet troops to have a qualitative edge against their allies if for whatever reason they were suddenly no longer allies.
So the Soviet military hardware the Arabs had wasn't as good as it could have been. Furthermore, Suvorov took a dim view of the quality of his own junior officers. And he pointed out that the military advisors sent to help the Arabs as they prepared for the war were, like the tanks they'd exported, not the highest possible quality available. Consequently he recalled many colleagues being convinced that the Arabs should win, because of a purely numerical assessment, instead of considering the balance of relative quality.
EDIT: Years later, after first writing this answer, it appears that Suvorov was more accurate than many assumed. At first, Western analysts assumed Suvorov was making it all up, because his conclusion was that the entire Soviet military was hopelessly corrupt, and that most junior and senior officers suffered delusional optimism. Suvorov told one peer in the 1960s that he doubted the Red Army could defeat West Germany, never mind combined NATO forces.
His first book, published in 1981, followed his defection to the UK in 1978. But this conflicted with a western narrative, pushed especially by the Reagan administration, that the Soviets were a serious threat. The Soviet government and CIA both knew by the early 1980s that Soviet society was in seemingly terminal decline. But this professional assessment was ignored by Reagan's administration for political reasons.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 suffered from the same problems Suvorov claimed existed in 1981. Principally corruption, which created equipment shortages and low morale. In one interview with Der Spiegel, Ukraine's head of military intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov, explained his thoughts on Russia's military failures:
"I am amazed at how incompetently and carelessly Russian commanders
have approached such a major operation. If they really believed that
they could do it in three days - and, as far as we know, they
absolutely believed that they could - then the Russian leadership is
probably wondering whether their generals are competent at all. They
took their wishful thinking for reality [...] We asked ourselves this question. And we found only one answer: the extremely low professional level of their generals. One of the reasons for this is nepotism in the Russian army, sham generals, relatives of some officials who don’t meet the performance criteria, unready to solve tasks."
The American government failed to acknowledge the decline and demise of the USSR, despite their best experts telling them the truth. Melvin Goodman was the CIA's Head of the Office of Soviet Affairs 1976-87, and he concluded:
“I think probably one of the greatest myths in America, in the
political discourse now, is that actions of the American government
were responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Union.
“The Soviet Union collapsed like a house of cards because it was a
house of cards. It rotted away from within. The economy was rotten,
the political process was rotten, they had developed a central
government that was no longer believed by people outside of Moscow,
there was total cynicism throughout the Soviet system of governance,
there was no real civil society.
“But the Reagan administration and their minions will tell you that
Afghanistan led to the collapse of the Soviet Union itself, the
collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the collapse of the East European
empire. We were saying that this was entirely fanciful. And the United
States missed all of this, because they believed their own myths and
their own fanciful notions. They had become their own victims of their
The American government also got the Falklands War wrong, believing the British could not retake the islands. More recently, the American government failed to anticipate how the war in Ukraine would unfold, delusional in their belief that the Russians would take Ukraine in a few days. Seems like Suvorov's writing is worth taking into account, because it would have accurately predicted the evolution of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.