Was it militarily possible to "island hop" the Philippines if not for MacArthur?

Question

The battle of Leyte Gulf in the Philippines led to the destruction of half of what remained of the Japanese navy. It also "sucked in" all the troops that Japanese could spare from elsewhere, leading to their deploying about half a million men in the Philippines, a disproportionate number, that could not be transferred after the Japanese naval defeat. So far so good.

With the above accomplished, was it militarily possible for the Americans to "island hop" the archipelago, capture only a few islands, "strand" the remaining Japanese, and "switch gears" to larger but now less-well-defended targets such as the modern Indonesia and Indochina, leaving the Japanese in the Philippines to wither on the vine, as had been the case in the Pacific Islands? (MacArthur was all for recapturing the Philippines but other military men disagreed with him.)

Did the Philippines actually have the strategic military or political importance that MacArthur attached to them, and need to be recaptured even if the Japanese had garrisoned them with a million men? Or was it even the case that the Americans had underestimated the transfer of Japanese troops to the islands, so that they thought they were facing X soldiers, when in fact, there was "a multiple of X" on the Philippines?

I know that a number of others argued for alternate plans, but were those plans soundly based on information known in the fall of 1944, or were they "after the fact" critiques or second guesses of MacArthur?

Answer 1

The islands of the Philippines are quite large and close together in comparison to the Pacific islands. A battalion or regiment of Japanese soldiers left on a small island many miles from anywhere else are stuck there, and can't contribute to the war.

A much larger group of Japanese soldiers on a large island can feed themselves from the island's resources. Since they likely include combat engineers, and have an island's population under their control, they can build or commandeer boats and move to another island in the group. So bypassing them doesn't take them out of the war.

If the whole of the Philippine archipelago could be isolated and bypassed, that should work, but it's rather large for doing that without nearby bases. It was important to cut the Japanese access to Indonesia, since that was their main source of oil, and that pretty well requires bases in the Philippines. That was their grand-strategic importance.

Answer 2

As an addendum to the other excellent answer:

If you owe the bank $100 that's your problem.

If you owe the bank $100 million, that's the bank's problem.

(attributed to Keynes and Getty).

The same goes for stranded/surrounded troops: a stranded battalion is doomed, a stranded army can cause trouble. Too many troops were stranded on Philippines.

A similar question was asked about the Operation Koltso - the assault on the surrounded 6th Army: maybe it was a better idea to let it starve?

In both cases the answer is the same:

• the economic importance of the territory occupied by the stranded troops and
• their potential for trouble making

override the desire to bypass it.

Answer 3

Nimitz proposed to attack Formosa/Taiwan instead, as being a more strategically advantageous target. The goal of taking either was to cut Japan off from its source of oil (Indonesia) and other raw materials like rubber. By taking either goal, the US would fully control the sea lanes between Japan and both Indonesia and Indochina, both were primary sources for raw war materials.

MacArthur made the case that the Philippine people, who had been living under US rule since the Spanish/American war, should be rescued from Japanese brutality, and that he had promised to return so that promise should be kept. Yes, the legendary MacArthur ego was a factor here.

Also, the Philippines weren't like the many smaller bases bypassed by US forces. They had enough natural resources on hand to keep Japanese forces supplied with food and water, neither of which could be found in any abundance in the smaller atolls and volcanic islands.

Finally, the defeat of the US forces in the Philippines in 1942 was a particularly bitter blow. The invasion and defeat of the Japanese forces would be a way of erasing that humiliation. So the choice of the Philippines was as much political and morale based, as it was based on military strategy.

Answer 4

As a veteran of WWII, during the invasion of the Philippines, this is my recollection. You must remember that Mac Arthur was kicked out of the Philippines by the Japanese. He left poor General Wainright there and said he would be back. WAINRIGHT suffered atrocities under the Japanese with forced marches.I can't remember if his group were forced to march in Bataan. But I do remember seeing pictures of him looking like very sickly and starved man. After the Philippines were conquered Gen. Mac Arthur came back as promised and became a hero. Wainright was for the most part ignored.

When we moved on to invade Japan after the bomb was dropped he took up residence in the Emperors palace. He was considered an arrogant person not liked by the troops that I served with. He was eventually fired by President Truman.

Answer 5

Looking at a map of the Pacific, it's hard to say how the Allies would bypass such a large Japanese base and maintain their supply lines while preparing for an invasion of Japan. It's also hard to say where they'd stage the troops, vehicles, supplies, and airfields for the invasion if not the Philippines; the Marianas alone would be insufficient for the 50 divisions expected. Formosa was proposed as an alternative, or addition. Either way, the Allies needed a large land base as close to Japan as possible for the invasion. Invading a place they knew well and had allies on the ground seems like a solid plan.

Such a large base, and its stockpiles of aircraft, ships, and supplies, would necessitate a siege to prevent them from being resupplied, and prevent them from conducting raids on Allied shipping. A siege on such a large scale would be nearly impossible and possibly drain more Allied resources than would be by invading, the trade-off of all sieges: the Pacific Ocean is really, really, really big. A better plan was to systematically destroy the Japanese merchant fleet which the Allies were well on their way towards, but half the fleet still remained.

Unlike smaller islands, the Philippines had a self-sustaining local economy. They could grow their own food. They had their own water supply. They would not "wither on the vine" like others. Though fuel and spares would be a concern, the island chain is so large their stockpiles may last for months of sustained operations. Their food could be exported, to the detriment of the local population and despite attempts at an Allied blockade, to feed an increasingly hungry Japan.

Finally, the Japanese would be "sucked in" to defend any major Allied invasion. The Allies were actively seeking this confrontation to remove the last major Japanese threat to their naval superiority. Prior to the invasion of the Philippines, the US Navy attacked Japanese air bases on Formosa so they could not be used to reinforce the Philippines. They provoked Japanese attacks, going so far as to use a crippled US ships as bait for the Japanese navy. Regardless of where they invaded, the US would continue these raids to further drain Japan's strategic capabilities.

The Japanese were also seeking this confrontation, it was their strategic plan all along, one big decisive naval battle. They were still seeking it despite obviously having no chance of strategic success. Shō-Go 1 nearly worked at a tactical level, but the result would always be the destruction of the last major warships of the Japanese fleet.

Answer 6

The other answers about the military difference to the Philippines garrison versus smaller islands, and the non-military necessity to "retake" the Philippines, all address good reasons.

However, there's a logical glitch underlying this question: The invasion began on October 20, and the Battle of Leyte Gulf began on October 23. The invasion was the precipitating trigger for the Decisive Battle at sea that both nations had been waiting for. Militarily, having committed the landing, it would have been nigh impossible to "back off" and bypass the Philippines.

So it's a bit contradictory to say that, having precipitated the Battle of Leyte Gulf with the invasion, couldn't the invasion just not have happened, given the pivotal nature of the Battle at sea.

Answer 7

I recall from some TV documentary saying that MacArthur was able to charm FDR to support his invasion of Philippines over the Nimitz plan.

MacArthur's career in non-USA sources is more checkered than the hero image in USA sources. After the disaster of Philippines (when MacArthur let his air force to be destroyed on the ground, even if he was warned about impeding attack - after Pearl Harbor), the only think what saved him from court martial was that FDR did not want yet another military disaster to decrease public's morale. FDR even asked MacArthur to change his saying to "We shall return" but vainglorious MacArthur refused.

Even invasion of Lyete was not strictly necessary (according that documentary) - spies found another unoccupied island nearby which would be easier to occupy and convert to a base - but plans were not changed.

Read some Australian/NZ resources about MacArthur, they are much more critical than USA sources. Apparently MacArthur was not overly concerned about the human losses caused by his plans.