According to Philip Boobbyer in The Stalin Era,
The transportation of industries to the east was a feat which the
party’s highly centralised structures were well suited for (Lieberman
1985: 71). It was nevertheless not a smooth operation, and was largely
improvised. Sometimes, evacuated goods were simply dumped to permit
empty trucks to return to the front.
John Erickson, in The Road to Stalingrad, says pretty much the same thing:
There had been only scant pre-war contingency planning, there were no
actual plans for any strategic industrial withdrawl into the eastern
The first evidence of any actual planning seems to be the 24th of June 1941 when (referring to major industrial plants in western areas)
the GKO created a Council for Evacuation to relocate these plants
eastward to the Urals and Siberia. The task of coordinating this
massive undertaking fell on N .A. Voznesensky, head of the Soviet
industrial planning agency GOSPLAN....on 4 July he won approval for the first war economic plan. The Council's deputy chairman, the future premier A.N. Kosygin, controlled the actual evacuation.
Source: David M. Glantz, Barbarossa. See also Document 8.5 Formation of State Defence Committee (GKO) in Boobbyer's in The Stalin Era.
Despite this massive effort, there were huge losses in industrial capacity as the German advance was so rapid, even though
in the second half of 1941 a monthly average of 165,000 railway
truckloads of industrial equipment rolled eastwards.
As further evidence of the lack of advanced planning, Glantz says:
All this machinery arrived in remote locations on a confused,
staggered schedule with only a portion of the skilled workforce...Somehow the machinery was unloaded and reassembled inside hastily constructed, unheated wooden buildings.
Even allowing for the hyperbole so common to Soviet accounts, this
massive relocation and reorganization of heavy industry was an
incredible accomplishment of endurance and organization.
Note: highlighting is mine