My curiosity for this question came from Nigel Biggar's book In Defense of War where he explores whether or not containment (in the form of sanctions or otherwise) would have been effective in the long run:
Richard Clarke and Peter Galbraith both reckon that continued control of relevant Iraq imports and further intrusive inspections by the IAEA would have been sufficient to avert the threat of WMD. Against this, however, Kenneth Pollack wrote in 2002 that containment was collapsing beyond repair. In that year smuggling conducted by Syria, Turkey, Jordan, and Iran was reckoned to earn Iraq between $2.5 billion and $3 billion (15-22 percent of Iraq's total revenue). What is more, since 1997 France, Russia, and China - all members of the Security Council - had been pressing for a relaxation of sanctions and inspections, in order to obtain oil and military contracts and to collect debts owed.
The debts were clearly large enough to deter some countries from backing renewed sanctions as detailed below:
Tony Blair reports that in mid-2001 Russian commercial interests obstructed agreement about new sanctions: "When Vladimir [Putin] and I discussed sanctions at the July 2001 Genoa G8 summit, he joked he was all in favor of them, provided we compensated him for the $8 billion that Iraq owed Russia" (A Journey, p395)
Footnote 166, pg. 297
While it's not common for a country to default on it's sovereign debt, it does happen. Did the new Iraqi government default on it's debts? Given the unique nature of it's creation, did the US assume any of the those debts? Or was there some other mechanism that allowed for their repayment?