Your question is essentially "How would a large scale mutiny be handled by a Western Allied power in World War One?" - to which we have the ready answer of the French response to the 1917 French Army Mutinies:
The mutinies and associated disruptions involved, to various degrees, nearly half of the French infantry divisions stationed on the Western Front. The term "mutiny" does not accurately describe events: soldiers remained in trenches and were willing to defend but rejected attack orders. The new commander, General Philippe Pétain, restored morale by talking to the men, promising no more suicidal attacks, providing rest for exhausted units, home leave, and moderate discipline. He held 3,400 courts martial; 554 mutineers were sentenced to death but only 26 were actually executed.
There were mass courts martial of ring leaders; numerous death sentences awarded by those courts; but in the end leniency to most of the ring leaders for the sake of overall morale.
Note the context - in time and space - of the mutiny: May 2, 1917, one week after the French attack as part of the Second Battle of Aisne by General Nivelle ended with failure of all its objectives and just three weeks after the successful Canadian assault on Vimy Ridge. In that latter battle the Canadians lost less than 3600 men over four days of fighting (April 9-12, 1917) while taking all objectives; fewer men over
the four days of successful fighting than the failed French attempt the previous June incurred every single day for nearly 30 days.
As with the vast majority of large-scale morale failures, the responsibility is, at root, the fault of commanding officers. When General Nivelle promised his men, before Second Aisne, a war ending victory if they would go over the top just one more time, he implied also "We have learnt how to do this right, and are doing it right this time." The combination of French abject failure and Canadian stunning victory, simultaneous in time and barely 60 miles apart, was the epitome of French high command incapability.