Japan's Admiral Nagumo has been criticized for not launching a "third strike" at Pearl Harbor, specifically to destroy the dry docks, fuel stores, repair facilities and other key infrastructure. The argument in favor of third strike is that it would have set back the American pacific war effort by a year or more, say until mid to late 1943. Weighed against this was the likelihood of heavier bomber losses that would be inflicted by now fully-alerted American defenses, and the chance that the "missing" American carriers would unexpectedly return and sink one or more Japanese carriers either outside Pearl Harbor, or on their way home (and low on fuel).
Sources like this American naval history argue that without the humongous (and totally unexpected) American victory at Midway, and the early shift in the balance of naval power, the American Pacific offensive would not have started until year after it did; that is summer/fall 1943, instead of the summer of 1942 (at Guadalcanal). That is, only the unforeseeable success at Midway made the Pearl Harbor infrastructure the critical time factor for the resurgence in American pacific activity. Presumably, the Japanese thought much the same thing.
If one were working on the assumption the Pearl Harbor infrastructure was NOT the critical time-determining factor, how would that affect the calculations about whether or not to launch a "third strike?"