The Gaza disengagement plan was revealed to the public by Ariel Sharon
in December 2003 at the Herzliya Conference, an Israeli policy
conference for high-ranking politicians, security analysts and other
bigwigs.1,4 The plan was adopted by the Israeli cabinet in
April 2004 and passed by the Israeli parliament in October the same
year.2,4 In Sharon's speech, he stated that:1
The purpose of the Disengagement Plan is to reduce terror as much as
possible, and grant Israeli citizens the maximum level of
security. The process of disengagement will lead to an improvement
in the quality of life, and will help strengthen the Israeli
economy.
He further asserted that only settlements in territory that would not
be included in the State of Israel would be evacuated and that Israel
would strengthen its control over settlements in territory it intended
to keep:
Settlements which will be relocated are those, which will not be
included in the territory of the State of Israel in the framework of
any possible future permanent agreement. At the same time, in the
framework of the Disengagement Plan, Israel will strengthen its
control over those same areas in the Land of Israel [Israel plus the
West Bank and the Gaza strip] which will constitute an inseparable
part of the State of Israel in any future agreement.
However, Sharon's plan faced stiff opposition both from within his own
party Likud and outside of it. Benjamin Netanyahu, who would later
become Israel's long-running prime minister, was one of its vocal
critics. To appease the plan's many critics the scope of the
disengagement and its rationale was changed.2
One argument added was that it would "serve to dispel the claims
regarding Israel's responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza
Strip".2,3 Under international law the Gaza Strip is
occupied by Israel and Israel is obliged to care for Gazans'
well-being. But the Israeli government argued that after disengagement
Gaza would no longer be occupied territory.
Another powerful agument in favor of disengagement was the
"demographic threat". The idea that Israel is a "Jewish and
democratic" state, but that too many non-Jews would force the state to
choose between remaining Jewish or remaining democratic. If the state
chooses democracy, Jewish dominance over the state would not be
guaranteed and the state would become a secular multi-ethnic
state. Perhaps like the U.S., where the white's dominance of the state
apparatus is slowly eroding. But if the state chooses to be Jewish, it
would need to implement apartheid against non-Jews to preserve its
Jewishness and that would not be democratic.
The Israeli security think tank INSS in a policy brief from 2005 argues
that the demographic threat was the impetus for the disengagement
plan:5
For many years a large majority in Israel has understood the
difficult and painful choices facing the country. One choice is to
quit the territories and divide the region into two states that will
leave Israel with narrower borders, but whose limited size is
essential for ensuring that Israel remains a democratic state with a
solid Jewish majority. The other choice is continued Israeli
deployment in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in order to retain
control over all of the territory between the Mediterranean and the
Jordan River, even if this results in the loss of a Jewish majority
in the area within a short time and / or the end of Israel as a
democratic state.
One person who understood the need for changing direction was Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon, who initiated the current political plan that
unilaterally cedes Israel's control of the land and the Arab
population in the Gaza Strip. ... Sharon's assumption is that this
step, which involves the evacuation of all Jewish settlements in the
Gaza Strip (home to approximately 8,000 people), will free Israel
from responsibility for 1.3 million Palestinians, an Arab population
whose birthrate is one of the highest in the world.
A month before Sharon presented his plan at Herzliya his deputy Ehud
Olmert warned about a need for radical policy change to avert the
demographic threat in an interview with Haaretz:6
There is no doubt in my mind that very soon the government of Israel
is going to have to address the demographic issue with the utmost
seriousness and resolve. This issue above all others will dictate
the solution that we must adopt. In the absence of a negotiated
agreement ... we need to implement a unilateral alternative... More
and more Palestinians are uninterested in a negotiated, two-state
solution, because they want to change the essence of the conflict
from an Algerian paradigm to a South African one. From a struggle
against 'occupation,' in their parlance, to a struggle for
one-man-one-vote. That is, of course, a much cleaner struggle, a
much more popular struggle – and ultimately a much more powerful
one. For us, it would mean the end of the Jewish state... the
parameters of a unilateral solution are: To maximize the number of
Jews; to minimize the number of Palestinians; not to withdraw to the
1967 border and not to divide Jerusalem... Twenty-three years ago,
Moshe Dayan proposed unilateral autonomy. On the same wavelength, we
may have to espouse unilateral separation... [it] would inevitably
preclude a dialogue with the Palestinians for at least 25 years.
- Address by PM Ariel Sharon at the Fourth Herzliya Conference-Dec 18- 2003
- The Israeli Disengagement Plan as a Conflict Management Strategy, Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, Kobi Michael
- The Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan
- The Politics and Economics of Israeli Disengagement, 1994-2006
- "Two Roads Diverged": Israel's Post-Disengagement Strategic Options
- 'Maximum Jews, Minimum Palestinians'