Why did the French "surrender" all of its troops during the armistice in World War II?

Question

After losing the Battle of France, in 1940, France concluded an "Armistice," basically a "cease fire in place," with Germany. (The borders were adjusted so the Germans were given the portion of the Atlantic coast that they had not captured, and they "retroceded" a small portion of central France to the Vichy government.) Losses were disproportionate, with the Germans losing 150,000 men, and the French suffering 2.5 times that much in physical casualties. The thing that surprised me was that France surrendered all of its men, nearly 2 million, in the Armistice, to become prisoners of war for the duration of the war.

Some alternatives follow.

1. Following the 1918 Armistice and the Versailles Treaty, the Germans had to pay a large indemnity, hand over their battleships, and reduce their army to 100,000 men, but the remainder did NOT become prisoners of war.

2. The Dutch "surrendered" in May, 1940, but made provisions for the parole of their soldiers in the summer and fall of that year.

3. In the shoes of the French government, I would have disbanded the army, had the enlisted men hand in their weapons, given them their discharge papers, and maintained only an officer corps to effect the surrender. This would keep most of the two million men out of the POW camps?

4. The French could have ordered their forces to fight until their ammunition gave out, a formula that had been established by Prussia's own Marshal Bluecher. This would have cost the Germans more casualties, and (presumably) given the Germans an incentive to negotiate.

So why did Vichy France agree to surrender its men, instead of disbanding its army, or having it paroled like the Dutch? Or was it the case that the nearly two million French were already POWs at the time of the armistice?

Answer 1

Tens of thousands of prisoners of war were taken between the 17th and the 22nd of June.

Then Président du Conseil (Head of Government) and Chief of Armies Philippe Pétain made a huge blunder when he announced on radio the 17th of June, 1940, that France was seeking an armistice with Germany and that

The fight must be stopped.

"il faut cesser le combat"

The consequence on the moral of French troops was devastating :

La phrase "C'est le coeur serré que je vous dis aujourd'hui qu'il faut cesser le combat" sème la consternation. Interprétée comme un cessez-le-feu, de nombreuses unités déposent les armes.

The sentence: "It is with a heavy heart that I tell you today that the fighting must stop" caused consternation. Interpreted as a cease-fire, many units lay down their arms.

The blunder was quickly noticed by the minister of foreign affairs Paul Baudouin, and the printed version of Petain's speech in the evening newspaper was amended into

je vous dis aujourd'hui qu'il faut tenter de cesser le combat.

I tell you today that we must try to stop fighting.

(my emphasis on the two added words)

However this is hardly less clumsy and didn't avoid misunderstandings.

Indeed, many troops that were facing advancing german units then stopped fighting or retreating and surrendered themselves to Germans, expecting to be released quickly. That's when the majority of captures happened:

La majorité des captures ont eu lieu après l'annonce de la demande d'armistice par le maréchal Pétain. Ceux qui ont alors été faits prisonniers, qu'ils aient combattu jusqu'au bout ou qu'ils se soient livrés, avaient des raisons d'espérer être libéré rapidement, une fois l'armistice signé.

The majority of the captures took place after the announcement of the armistice request by Marshal Pétain. Those who were then taken prisoner, whether they fought to the limit or surrendered, had reason to hope to be released quickly, once the armistice was signed.

However, the armistice had still not been agreed upon and would not be until the 22nd. Until that date, the Germans had no reason to treat captured enemies as anything other than prisoners of war, who would continue to be an important bargaining chip in Hitler's hands for the next three years.

Answer 2

There were already numerous French soldiers taken as prisonners of war when the Armistice happened.

2/ Those prisonners of war could have been paroled, but the Germans did not trust France. OP mentionned Dutch army as an example to follow, however while Dutch army was small and easily beaten, France was an other matter. The Germans, in 1940, could not take the risk.

Later on, the Germans, with more confidence in themselves and in neutrality in war and internal collaboration of Vichy France, established the "STO" (mandatory work service): they litterally "trade" prisoners of war in exchange of workers in german industries. Note that this was not always a good trade since sabotage of the production happened, example given Herman Buchner's Focke Wulf 190 in 1943.

1/ For the 1918 example: the difference is that war ended everywhere in 1918, which was not the case in 1940. So we fall back into the 2/ case of the Germans wanted a "security" with those prisoners of war. Again, note that French prisoners of war were used as workers, especially as farmers because German campaigns had lost their men to the army. So those prisoners of war had value.

3/ This could be a possibility, but again already numerous soldiers had been taken as prisoners of war. Note that remaining units, as in the Alpes mountains, that were not defeated by the Germans in 1940 stayed "free" as units of French Vichy's army. So does for colonial units. I think the solution of disbanding soldiers to avoid capture was used, but I can't find back sources so it might be a mistake from my memory.

4/ Nobody in the French government by that time had the willingness to fight to the last man. But some French units, like former mentionned in Alpes mountains, did.

Answer 3

As noted in the OP, armstice means a ceasefire - not a peace agreement. Formally Vichy France and Germany remained in the state of war till the end of their existence.

The situation was militarily lost in June 1940, to the extent that the French had no means to prevent German army from overrunning the metropolitan France. Thetefore, the last days of the Raynaud's government (before Pétain became the prime minister) were centered on the choice between seeking peace with Germans and the capitulation.

Capitulation meant acknowledging military defeat: the army would surrender, but the state of war would still exist, and the government could continue the war from the French colonies.

Peace agreement meant placing the responsibility for war on the politicians, and essentially acknowledging that the German cause was just.

Unsurprisingly, the generals opposed the capitulation, i.e., accepting the blame for the defeat. And Hitler had good reasons to let them have a small part of the French mainland in exchange for their collaboration. The French prisoners of war played a part of hostages - Pétain has actively sought their release (via making a peace agreement), using this as one of justifications for closer collaboration with Germans, whereas Hitler did not trust that France would remain pro-German, once it had its soldiers back. It is also necessary to note that, despite the collaboration, Vichy France never formally joined the war on the German side.