Physicist/statistician Edwin T. Jaynes, in a broad overview of the history of ideas about reasoning amidst uncertainty (precursors to Bayesian inference), attributes an early articulation of an important principle of reasoning to Herodotus, as follows (reference below):
Herodotus, in about 500 BC, discusses the policy decisions of the Persian kings. He notes that a decision was wise, even though it led to disastrous consequences, if the evidence at hand indicated it as the best one to make; and that a decision was foolish, even though it led to the happiest possible consequences, if it was unreasonable to expect those consequences.
Others have cited Jaynes' attribution of this principle to Herodotus (e.g., Devinder Sivia, in his tutorial text on Bayesian statistics; he mistakenly cites the passage as a quote from Herodotus).
Where does Herodotus make this observation? I suspect Jaynes is paraphrasing observations Herodotus makes less tersely and less directly. I'm guessing Jaynes is referring to observations in Herodotus' Histories. I've done some searching and skimming of Histories, but with no luck finding something citable (I confess I haven't read Histories in full; depending on the version, it's 600 to 800 pages).
Can anyone point to a particular passage in Herodotus' writings where he makes this observation?
D. Sivia & J. Skilling, Data Analysis: A Bayesian Tutorial (2006), p. 4; at Oxford U. Press