How did Royal Navy tactics change after the sinking of HMS Prince of Wales?

Question

On 10th December 1941, the Royal Navy battleship HMS Prince of Wales, and escorting battlecruiser HMS Repulse were sunk near Malaysia by a force of Imperial Japanese bombers. This was a powerful indicator of the vulnerability of surface vessels to aircraft. The question is, how did Royal Navy tactics change in response to this attack?

Answer 1

The Royal Navy change its strategy and its tactics in response to this event, and to former events that also had shown the vulnerability of heavy ships to air attacks.

The change in tactic consisted in:

• Reinforcing antiaircraft capabilities aboard all types of ships
• Forming massive fleets with a lot of light cruisers and destroyers to escort the heavier ships, many more than the few destroyers that were alongside Prince of Wales of Repulse
• As much as possible, provide an aircraft carrier or land-based aircraft escort to these fleets

The change in strategy consisted in:

• Limiting the use of battleships in big operations close to land, especially in the Mediterranean sea
• Focusing battleships on the role of deterrence of German battleships/heavy cruisers in the Atlantic and on the role of far-away escort of convoys, for example in the Barents Sea were destroyers assumed the close escort, and battleships stayed far, ready to intervene if a German battleship should intervene

Answer 2

I don't see where there was little in a of change of tactics that would have directly resulted from the loss of REPULSE or PRINCE OF WALES.

Most leaders of the major navies were well aware that capital ships were in grave danger from torpedo hauling airplanes in the absence of any sort of air support themselves.

Major navies of the early 1940’s were well aware that 1930s era and before anti-aircraft defense suites were inadequate for the job when facing modern aircraft, hence you see upgrades in numbers, quantities, and improved weapons in the major players, RN and USN from 1940 and on. For the IJN, not as much in the IJN for ships already in service, but their limited new construction, well, that’s another matter.

Additional smaller anti-aircraft weapons such as the Bofors 40mm proliferated just about anywhere they could find space. Compare anti-aircraft suites for USS NEVADA, in 1941 – 12 @ 5 in individual dual purpose mounts, 4 @ 1.1 in AA and 8 @ .50 cal machine guns (Janes 1942). In 1945 – (from Janes 1945) 16 dual purpose 5 in in twin turrets and over 100 40mm and 20mm. Or, sticking with the RN, HMS NELSON, for example, in 1941 sported 6 4.7 in AA, 4 3 lbs AA and 3 multiple mount 2 lbs pompom 4 to 6 barrels per mount. In 1945 you’d see the 6 4.7 inch AA, 16 40 mm Bofors, 42 2 lbs pompom in various mounts and 61 20 mm Oerlikon (all as reported in the 1942 and 1945 Janes). Obviously, more was better. Airplanes, especially armed with a torpedo, were ship killers and everyone knew it.

And of course, not immediately, but by 1944 most capital ships, at least RN and USN had the advantage of radar controlled systems, but that’s naught to do with the destruction of Force Z.

Increasing the number of escorts, to include anti-aircraft specific cruisers, was already an obvious solution. The RN types such as the DIDO class had already come off the ways starting in 1939, 3 of them in that year, another 3 in 1940 and a last in 1941; the first 4 of the 8 USN ATLANTA class were launched in late 1941 and had joined the fleet by early 1942 the last 4 came to after July 1943.

There was nothing new that could be traced directly to the loss of Force Z. Everything which came about from 1939 and on, defense weapons, increase escorts, specialized AA cruisers, keeping one’s distance, air defense with carrier based aircraft, cruising formations, single carrier task forces to multi-carrier task forces, all were already part and parcel of existing doctrine and strategy or were natural outgrowths of the evolution of naval warfare.

I regret that I cannot point to trusted online availability (at least that I’m willing to venture a trust) of 1942 and 1945 Janes such as I can pull off my shelves.