Did any German generals question the wisdom of Störfang (June 1942 attack on Sevastopol), right before Case Blue?

Question

Currently reading Where the Iron Crosses Grow: The Crimea 1941-44 by Forczyk which is now looking at the attack on Sevastopol in June 1942: Störfang, led by Manstein.

This is an odd battle by German standards, infantry on infantry, using super-heavy German guns to reduce the Soviet fortress.

Interesting book, but one subject it barely touches on is the larger strategic context.

Hitler originally really got worked up about Crimea when the Soviets bombed the Rumanian oilfields Ploesti, calling it an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" and calling for its elimination.

But by summer 1942, Case Blue is in full planning. The Germans intend to pretty much take over the Caucasus which would leave Sevastopol to wither on the vine (as the Black Sea coast would be under their control). They are firmly in command of the air and Ploesti has largely been unmolested since the early days. It's hard to see why the Germans could not have just left a holding force where Crimea joins the mainland and largely ignored what the Soviets were up to on the Crimea.

Instead, they will put 200k men against Petrov's 100k, with no hope of Kesselschlacht (encirclement battles), on a tight deadline against Fall Blau and needing massive logistical efforts to move in the requisite guns and ammo. Then they will have to move them back out of the peninsula.

Yes, the Störfang casualty counts favor Germany, but partially because the Germans perform unexpectedly well against an enemy which has until then been quite competent (by early Soviet standards). In any case, it is a distraction from the main effort and one can't help thinking that a bit of extra fuel left in the tank would have been helpful once Stalingrad really gets underway only two months later (I am counting from the Aug 23 Luftwaffe raid on the city proper). If Fall Blau, under its original name of Braunschweig proper starts on June 28, what the heck were they doing w Störfang only 4 weeks earlier?

Did any German generals record any objections over the need to carry out this operation at all? It's still early enough in the war for them to be somewhat able to speak, isn't it? If not, do historians identify it as another one of Hitler's useless diversions - akin to say weakening the drive on Moscow in 1941 by favoring Kiev and Leningrad midway, before refocussing on Moscow?

Answer 1

This is only a partial answer but looking at Manstein’s memoir, “Lost victories” he is often very critical of decisions imposed on him throughout the book (often against Hitler or OKH). However this criticism is missing when he recounts commanding the 11th army in the conquest of the Crimea. He gives the strategic objectives as protecting the Romanian oil fields, eliminating a possible thorn in the German flank (which within the year would be stretched to the limit around Stalingrad and as such was pressuambly helped by not having to leave forces to protect the coast around the Crimea), providing a springboard for later offensives beyond rostov and also to have a positive effect on turky's opinion of the Germans (which presumably was successful based on the export of minerals to Germany from turkey https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German%E2%80%93Turkish_Treaty_of_Friendship#:~:text=In%20October%201941%2C%20Turkey%20and,of%20military%20equipment%20to%20Turkey which I would imagine were transferred across the black sea (it being the shortest route between turkey and axis occupied Europe, which would of been much harder had the black sea fleet had Crimea to operate from, as it was the black sea fleet had no facliaties with which to properly maintain its ships, according to wikipedia " The remainder of the Black Sea Fleet evacuated to ports in the Caucasus that had very limited facilities.", "In 1943, the Black Sea Fleet was reduced to the following ships, which all suffered from poor maintenance due to a lack of facilities:" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Sea_campaigns_(1941%E2%80%931944))

"One reason for this was the favorable effect the capture of the peninsula was expected to have on the attitude of Turkey. Another even more pressing one was the threat of the enemy's big Crimean air bases to the Rumanian oilfields ...After the Crimea had been taken, the Eleventh Army's corps of mountain troops was to move over the Straits of Kerch towards the Caucasus, evidently to reinforce an offensive beyond Rostov."

"should it be considered crucial to advance on Rostov, the Crimea would have to be left behind for the time being. In that event, however, it would be difficult to tell when, if ever, the forces needed to conquer the peninsula could be made available. Besides, in the hands of an enemy with command of the sea the Crimea was liable to become a serious menace deep in the flank of the Eastern Front, quite apart from the fact that the air bases would continue to threaten the Rumanian oilfields. "

Without further research it is difficult to make firm claims, but I would argue that at least Mainstein did not consider the conquest of Crimea a strategic error. He seems even to considered it necessary to take and that 1942 was perhaps the best opportunity for seizing it. I do not however know what modern historians think of this descision.

Answer 2

I have read a book written by Jean Lopez about the battle of Stalingrad, that covered the overall 1942 strategic context on the Eastern Front. I don't remember that it mentionned any contestations by a German general about this operation. So based on that I answer No to the first question.

To the second question (what is the historical point of view of this operation), I think you'll find with this operation an example of the "It's never good" paradox, namely: whatever the solution you gave, only the drawbacks will be highlighted and said to compensate the advantages, even if for an other solution the same advantages that are not obtained are said to be sooo important.

To explain what I meant by that, if you consider the capture of Sevastopol, here are the main arguments:

Solution "Take Sevastopol before":

• It will suppress the Soviet fleet in central Black Sea, thus allowing naval logistics for the attack of Donbass
• It will free units in Crimea that otherwise to guard the position

Solution "Leave it as it is":

• Less losses will be sustained and more logistics able to prepare Fall Blau
• Fall Blau could start earlier

The problem is that this advantages/drawbacks could not be considered easily, and that allows someone to say "it's better to have fleet logistics" and another one "it's better to start earlier". Comparing these two arguments is very difficult.

My two cents: My understanding of the ultimate failure of Fall Blau is that it was not the earliest logistic deficiencies that create problems for the Germans to capture Stalingrad and Caucasus, and that this was more about a lack of intelligence and a problem in strategy. Also, even if a few German soldiers could have helped the other Axis armies that were defeated, their lack was about armoured troops and artillery rather than infranty.

If you take this point of view, then all the arguments of "Leave it as it is" have no impact anymore, leaving the "Take Sevastopol before" as the better solution.

Thus, I would answer No as well for the second question.