69

Short Answer Allied superiority in cryptography versus both the Germans and the Japanese can be broadly attributed to (1) better/greater coordination among personnel, awareness of vulnerabilities, and allocation of resources for breaking enemy codes and, (2) the fact that Axis codes were (mostly, though not always) more easy to break than Allied ones. ...


61

From the "contemporary German perspective", the answer is doubtless "Alaric", Juan Pujol García, known to the British as "Garbo". He was paid a total of US$340,000 and awarded the Iron Cross, second class, in July 1944 for his contributions to the war effort. He operated a network that grew to 27 sub-agents in all parts of the UK, communicating via post to ...


21

As the author of the CIA article, R. C. Jaggers, does not cite any sources, it is difficult to establish with certainty why he used the name 'Operation Salmon'. The most likely reason may be that Operation Salmon was an earlier designation for Operation Anthropoid (which raises the question as to why he preferred one over the other), but - amidst a fair ...


13

I think that when war is declared, there is generally a fear of fifth columns operating at home on behalf of the enemy. I can offer a few examples from the first and second world wars. Ahead of the first world war, MI5 had prepared extensive lists of potential fifth-columnists who they thought should be interned should hostilities break out [Andrew, 2009]. ...


12

Curiously, after a bit of research I found this - a comment on the Amazon Kindle entry for the "book" The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich Kindle Edition Make of it what you will, but possibly it is simply a CIA screw up, or at the very least by its author R.C.Jaggers. The commenter goes by the handle of Kallisto and writes: First of all, you can get ...


12

Evidently, yes. The recently declassified 1946 History of the Signal Security Agency Volume II The General Cryptanalytic Problems has information on this subject. The section covering solution of Chinese secret communications is pp.180-189. (This is the internal end-of-war report of the US Army's codebreaking organization.) Messages of both the KMT and ...


10

The Western allies were not clueless about the Soviet espionage. However, they could not prevent it and were probably underestimating its extent. The reason they were unable to prevent it is manifold. The nature of science (and the Manhattan project was much more an open-ended research enterprise than a typical modern-style DARPA project) as understood ...


9

As it was one of the more spectacular, I'd like to point to the Incident at Venlo, Netherlands at 9th December 1939, which severely crippled British intelligence and created excuse for the invasion: On September 3, 1939, Britain declared war on Germany. The Netherlands, a neutral state bordering the Reich, was now on the front line of the espionage war. ...


8

The only reference similar to what you ask would have been in Operation Corona, when some British planes carried German speaking radio operators to give wrong directions to nightfighters. That said, I doubt this would have been tried beyond tactical, immediate level in air combat, because: The setup was not easy (including finding radio operators who spoke ...


8

Before 1914, the 2 organizations that existed were very small: Army (Abteilung III b): 1908 3, 1914: 5 officers Navy (Nachrichtenstelle (N)): 1897: 5, 1900: 2, 1914: unknown Since 1910 there was an active cooperation with Austria (k.u.k. Evidenzbüro). In August 1914, 21 spies were arrested in the United Kingdom and since no communications were possible, ...


7

The atypical and clandestine nature of the work essentially means that ranks don't make much sense for spies. KGB operatives, especially those operating outside the USSR, would need a diverse set of skills, of which rank would be the least important. Skills like general familiarity with the country they would operate in, good or even expert knowledge of the ...


6

There were many people fleeing the Nazis in the 1930s, a lot of them Jewish. Mostly these people were welcomed by Britain. However what greatly complicated their assimilation into British society was that a lot of them were German speakers. Passports did not record people's religion, merely their nationality. So for official purposes, fleeing Jews from ...


6

Seals were less about verification of identity, and more about verification of non-tampering. As with all significant documents today, the presence (and seals or signatures) of witnesses was the most important aspect of identity- and authentication-verification. Placing the author's/authorizer's seal at the bottom of the written text was more about ...


6

I'm going to take a 10,000 foot view of this. While the scale and speed of the problem has grown immensely, we're still dealing with the same basic sorts of issues that lead to someone wrapping their cigars in a secret order in 1862 and losing the Battle of Antietam. The details have changed, but the basics remain the same. And I'm going to speak about what ...


6

Q How realistic were von Papen's plans to invade Canada using “German cowboys” during the Great War? Interesting. But. Not. "Not very realistic" was what analysts judged it later, his superior at the time, and the man himself in hindsight. There were merely a few organizational details needing clarification. Wirth suggested that the entire operation ...


5

CROWCASS was initiated after the war was essentially won and the Allies had the resources of Germany and everyone in it at their disposal. They had hundreds of thousands of people in prisons and camps and gigantic interrogation teams. German officers and leaders were interned in special prisons and subjected to round the clock interrogation. Many German ...


5

During WW2 the British used an actor who bore a striking resemblance to Montgomery, to throw off the Germans as to British intentions on invading France. M. E. Clifton James was noticed when he appeared as 'Monty' in a British stage production, and was recruited by fellow actor David Niven to actually impersonate Montgomery, to the edification of German ...


5

I think you are right that a closer look at the makeup of the 33-member Duquesne Nazi Spy Ring might be instructive here. While every member of the ring had pre-existing ties to foreign countries*, not one of them came to the USA as a refugee from Germany. Several in fact didn't come from Germany at all. The ringleader was South African. There were in fact ...


5

If we're going purely on the evidence presented in Elizabeth Sparrow's "Secret Service" then I'd say that Robespierre wasn't "acting as directed by a British paymaster". Sparrow seems to have researched her subject thoroughly, using not only British and French public and private archives but also others in Switzerland, Germany and Sweden. The book ...


5

The "CIA's secret report" by R. C. Jaggers reads like a "as told by" version of some primary document originating outside the CIA. The CIA of course did not exist in 1942, and its predecessor, the OSS, had nothing to do with the operation. So this report might be a version of an account appearing in the Czech press, or a memoir by a Czech official of some ...


5

Robert Hanssen qualifies. Hanssen never told the KGB or GRU his identity and refused to meet them personally, with the exception of the abortive 1993 contact in the Russian embassy parking garage. The FBI believes the Russians never knew the name of their source.


4

A classic example would be the pre-D-day deception aimed at making the German's believe that the actual invasion was to take place at the Pas de Calais. An entire fake army, the First United States Army Group was invented as part of Operation Fortitude South. To help sell the effect and convince the Germans that this was the main invasion force, a large ...


4

Beside Culper, you may be thinking of the Clark Ring in Philadelphia, and the Mersereau Ring of Staten Island, both of which are mentioned on page 4 of Covert operations and the emergence of the modern American presidency, 1920-1960 by John J Carter ...espionage networks like the Culper Ring, which also engaged in disinformation activities. In ...


4

The very breaking of Enigma - by Turing et al using Bombe and also by pinching of the German Naval codebooks - gave the British a blind spot that did nearly cost them the war. That blind spot was that German Naval Intelligence had broken the British Merchant Marine codes in 1938-9 and was reading transmissions using that code into 1944. The British never ...


3

If there were Allied spies in Berlin during the war, they would have been seeking information of more immediate value. The CROWCASS lists were not finished until 1947, so there would have been plenty of time to use German records after the war. One source that may have contributed was the card-index at Bletchley Park. That indexed every name, place, ship, ...


3

There was lots of spying and surveillance being done by the military, producing copious amounts of often quite mundane data that was then analyzed for its military usefulness. All it took was to make it someone's job to look through that same data for evidence of war crimes.


3

Probably Cardinal Talleyrand, who had been Napoleon's foreign minister and was still on his Council of State while working with the Coalition to unseat Napoleon after 1807.


3

Yes, the People's Republic of China has the MSS, and before that, the CDSA. Other China (Taiwan) has the NSB.


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