Napoleon's centre of gravity for his army was fast mobility and forced marches. therefore he enforced training for his troops to live and forage of the land this worked within Europe where fertile lands made this practice easy. organising his army into corps and Regiments he was able to ensure a fluidity and freedom of movement within the battlespace this is more exceptional when you take into account he faced enemy's with the same technology (peer to peer).

Russia was a different matter entirely the invasion was planned during 1811 in Germany he crossed into Russia in 1812. his estimation of the campaign was that due to his 600 000 troops the Russian czar Alexander would immediately surrender. he estimated it would take a total of three weeks. The Russian generals new they could not beat Napoleon head on already knowing his tactics and taking advantage of his need to bring Russia to heal quickly to ensure the reinstatement of the effectiveness of his "continental system" Russia's troops kept withdrawing further into Russia and only taking part in small skirmishes in order to ensure the French army never relaxed. Then Russia stated to commit to scorched earth burning the winters crops so the French could not utilise them.

When napoleon got to Moscow he was at 300 000 troops (some historians say 200 000) the Russia burnt Moscow to deny Napoleon the ability to rest and recuperate there. Napoleon withdrew from Russia trying to avoid the scorched earth however Russia attacked napoleons army forcing them to go back along the scorched earth when Napoleon eventually got back to Germany he had a meagre 30 000 troops.

Napoleons Russia campaign is not so much a lesson in failure of logistical systems more so a lesson that an army must always strive to eliminate any weakness within logistical systems as there is nothing that will control how an army can utilise a battlespace more.

Napoleon's centre of gravity for his army was fast mobility and forced marches. Therefore, he enforced training for his troops to live and forage off the land. This worked within Europe where fertile lands made this practice easy. Organising his army into corps and regiments, he was able to ensure a fluidity and freedom of movement within the battlespace. This is more exceptional when you take into account that he faced enemies with the same technology (peer to peer).

Russia was a different matter entirely. The invasion was planned during 1811 in Germany. He crossed into Russia in 1812. His estimation of the campaign was that, due to his 600,000 troops, the Russian Czar Alexander would immediately surrender. He estimated it would take a total of three weeks.

The Russian generals knew they could not beat Napoleon head on. Already knowing his tactics and taking advantage of his need to bring Russia to heel quickly, to ensure the reinstatement of the effectiveness of his "continental system", Russia's troops kept withdrawing further into Russia. Only taking part in small skirmishes in order to ensure the French army never relaxed. Then Russia stated to commit to scorched earth, burning the winter's crops so the French could not utilise them.

When Napoleon got to Moscow he had 300,000 troops (some historians say 200,000). The Russians burnt Moscow to deny Napoleon the ability to rest and recuperate there. Napoleon withdrew from Russia trying to avoid the scorched earth, however, the Russians attacked Napoleon's army forcing them to go back through the scorched earth areas. When Napoleon eventually got back to Germany he had a meagre 30,000 troops.

Napoleons Russia campaign is not so much a lesson in failure of logistical systems more so a lesson that an army must always strive to eliminate any weakness within logistical systems as there is nothing that will control how an army can utilise a battlespace more.