In the end of 1941 and beginning of 1942, the Soviets had multiple problems with artillery.

The first one was shell and batteries disponbility: there was not enough of them for field artillery. It was not that much a problem since the mud, and later the snow, reduced the capacity of artillery to inflict damages. So the Soviets relied on infiltration tactics with mobile units made for low intensity fights: light armoured cars, cavalry units, skiing units, airborne troops...

The second problem they faced was numerous air attacks made by the Luftwaffe againt the cities. Despite primitive radars and an increasing number of airplanes, front line operations were the priority and Soviets had to rely a lot on anti aircraft artillery to repel German raids. This artillery needed multiple data to be effective: how airplane behave, deflection, ballistic, how to stop a group of planes rather than destroy each airplane one by one (which is impossible in fact).... According to colonel Proektor, out of 4 000 airplanes targeting Moscow during eponym battle, only 120 airplanes actually reached and bombed targets over Moscow.

So I don't have primary sources on Kolmogorov, but it is probable that he helped in anti aircraft artillery based in Moscow rather than field artillery.

In the end of 1941 and beginning of 1942, the Soviets had multiple problems with artillery.

The first one was shell and batteries availability: there was not enough of them for field artillery. It was not that much a problem since the mud, and later the snow, reduced the capacity of artillery to inflict damages. So the Soviets relied on infiltration tactics with mobile units made for low intensity fights: light armoured cars, cavalry units, skiing units, airborne troops...

The second problem they faced was numerous air attacks made by the Luftwaffe againt the cities. Despite primitive radars and an increasing number of airplanes, front line operations were the priority and Soviets had to rely a lot on anti aircraft artillery to repel German raids. This artillery needed multiple data to be effective: how airplane behave, deflection, ballistic, how to stop a group of planes rather than destroy each airplane one by one (which is impossible in fact).... According to colonel Proektor, out of 4 000 airplanes targeting Moscow during eponym battle, only 120 airplanes actually reached and bombed targets over Moscow.

So I don't have primary sources on Kolmogorov, but it is probable that he helped in anti aircraft artillery based in Moscow rather than field artillery.