When two enormous armies meet, only a relatively small number of infantrymen can engage at the same time. At Borodino, the battle started when Napoleon's forces attacked Kutuzov's right flank. At thatany time, probably: maybe only a few thousand, maybe only a few hundred, musketeers on each side wereare in a position to fire. The remaining men wereare simply targets, waiting their turn to move forward to the firing line or to be slaughtered. If you look at the figures for cartridges fired, it is not much more than one per person, on both sides.
At Borodino, the main action was at the Bagration fleches, which were taken and re-taken by the French and Russians, and then the Raevsky redoubt. Most of the forces not directly involved in that area were made to wait, suffering terrible losses from artillery fire.
While the account of the battle in Tolstoy's "War and Peace" cannot be regarded as a reliable historical account, it probably gives a useful insight: Prince Andrei's regiment was held in reserve for the first eight hours of the battle, in which time they sustained losses of several hundred men, without firing a single shot.
On the other hand, the artillery on both sides were able to shootfire from a much greater distance and, trusting that they knew where the enemy soldiers were, many of them were firing continuously through out the whole battle- each cannon fired, on average, roughly 100 rounds.
It therefore makes sense to compare the number of rounds fired, rather than the number of guns. Three times as many musket shots were fired as cannonballs, but muskets used a tiny amount of powder, and would only be audible in the immediate vicinity, whereas any cannon firing anywherefire would be audible over the entire battlefield.