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In the movie Imitation Game, there is a scene where a message is decrypted. In this message, a German submarine says he's going to attack a ship: the decoders decide not to warn the ship because they are afraid the Germans could understand that Enigma is cracked, and they don't do anything.

From the Wikipedia page on the movie, it is said that the decision was not taken by the decoders of Bletchey Park themselves but at higher levels.

My question is: Assuming that it was taken at the "correct" high level, was such a decision ever taken?

My research about this on internet showed no results saying it was taken, for example here.

Also, I know about several devices and tactics of WW2 that makes unlikely such a decision:

  • German submarines would follow procedures and not communicate to high command during an attack, especially when underwater. Thus, the German high command would not know about how the submarine was lost, so concluding that Enigma was broken would have been far-fetched
  • British navy used in WWs "Q-ships", which where used as decoys apparently easy to attack but suddendly revealing themselves as submarine chasers
  • Zigzags were followed by convoys to avoid being intercepted easily, thus changing route to avoid being attacked by a submarine would not raise alert to the Germans
  • Even if Bletchey knew a submarine was about to attack, air or naval reconnaissance was still needed to locate precisely and destroy the submarine. Thus, to use Enigma intelligence needed to use other sources of intelligence that could justify the destruction of the submarine
  • Also, not sure that they knew it by the time, but Allied merchant ships production was more important than losses and the rate of progression of German submarine production was not so good, thus performing attrition right now on German submarines was better than waiting for an hypothetical "big battle" where plenty of German submarines would be destroyed thanks to Enigma (wolfpack tactics grouped only ten or twenty German submarines)
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  • That seems unlikely, because of the time involved. It takes time (at least a few hours) to communicate with that high level, and then it must go down the chain as well. And I doubt if the Supreme allied command would like to be bothered with 'can we hit this submarine?' type of questions.
    – Jos
    Commented Sep 2 at 1:10
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    IIRC, part of the plot of Cryptonomicon was that there was a special commando unit in WWII tasked with performing operations to help make it look like stuff they figured out through code-breaking could have been figured out some other way. I believe that unit is entirely fictional, but its an interesting idea.
    – T.E.D.
    Commented Sep 2 at 2:15
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    @Jos - IIRC, it took time (hours) to do a single decryption as well. So it would have been much more useful for "We're going to invade at X next week" than for "We're going to try to sink ship X right now."
    – T.E.D.
    Commented Sep 2 at 2:27
  • Wikipedia claim that the allies did go to some length to cover up the fact that they had broken Enigma, but on at least one occasion they had to improvise a cover after they had acted on intelligence that arrived to hot to be able to cover through "accidental" discovery by other means. There is however nothing like the exact circumstances described in the question.
    – andejons
    Commented Sep 2 at 10:21
  • According to Wikipedia, the movie is based on the biography: en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alan_Turing:_The_Enigma. Not an answer as i haven't looked at either, but to interrogate this claim, get the book and see if it is made there, and what source the author has. OTOH I have read the Robert Harris novel, titled Enigma, where a similar claim is made. You could look into what research Harris did. The film could have got the idea from the novel, or they both could have got it from elsewhere - only by finding the origin of the claim will you find out its truth value.
    – Ne Mo
    Commented Sep 2 at 16:56

2 Answers 2

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Yes it happened

There is a paper from "The Naval Historical Society of Australia" with title "Ultra and the Battle of the Atlantic - The True Story" in which are reported book sources (I found it really interesting).

In early 1943, Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), pushed to use U-boat location information derived from Ultra to attack Germany’s tanker U-boats (known as Milch Cows).

… in 1943 the changing locations of these Milchcows became available to us through Ultra. By this time too, there was very close liaison between Coastal Command and their American counterpart who were especially able to cover the southern Atlantic convoy routes. With typical enthusiasm the Americans were all for sinking the Milchcows at once; they were, however, persuaded by Jack Slessor, Commander-in-Chief Coastal Command, not to give Doenitz cause to suspect Ultra and the Milchcows were quietly sent to the bottom over a reasonable time; it must have been one of the greatest blows suffered by the U boats.

book source: Winterbotham, F.W., The Ultra Secret, Futura Publications Limited, A Contact Book, page 111.

It is interesting how to disrupt the u-boat menace, where attacked the tanker, i.e. attack on logistic instead of u-boat themselves

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  • Thanks for the link. I also had read that Ultra helped to target U-tanker, even if the u-boat defeat in 1943 has little to do with that and far more with the massacre of submarines that Allied convoys were able to performed, and thus I would limit the conclusion. Still, thanks because this is entirely in the scope of the question Commented Sep 3 at 18:23
  • @totalMongot From the essay, it seems that more than sinking u-boat the target was to allow secure navigation to the convoy - in this regards targeting the U-tanker was effective
    – Dan M
    Commented Sep 4 at 7:30
  • Yes I understand that it is the point made, but my knowledge on the Atlantic war tells me the contrary: the U boats were still able to patrol in the Atlantic at the end of 1943. There problem was that as soon as they wanted to go back or from bases, they were sunk. As soon as they wanted to attack a convoy, they were sunk. In this context, attacking U-tanker was interesting for securing some convoys but was not the key element of U-Boat 's defeat Commented Sep 4 at 18:11
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No, such decisions were never taken.

You already answered your question partially:

  • Submarines wouldn't communicate when attacking
  • Q-ships would contact through their chain of command

Bletchey Park would need time, and a lot of it, to decode a message. At least a couple of hours, more likely a lot longer, like a full day.

They would send the transcripts to the relevant higher authorities, not the people in the field. The higher authorities would decide what to do, and pass it down through the chain of command. This was a fairly automatic process, but it would take time.

By automatic I mean their were procedures: In the Mediterranean the Royal Navy was under strict orders not to attack based on Enigma information alone (for those who knew about it), unless confirmed by other means. Cunningham (those under him probably didn't know about Enigma) was clever enough to send an reconnaissance patrol immediately in the general area, to make the Germans believe a plane discovered the ships, rather than code breaking.

That makes it very unlikely that decrypted Enigma documents were used tactically. The time required both ways made it only useful strategically. (with thanks to @T.E.D.)

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  • I have to disagree with your answer; and the reason is in yout writing: "In the Mediterranean the Royal Navy was under strict orders not to attack based on Enigma information". This one (of which I would like the source) is saying: Enigma information could be used tactically, but needed confirmation. If it wasn't suitable, it would have not needed confirmation (too old of an information). I add that the information sharing should have been quicker than you think: weather bulletin were shared and while not communicating while attacking, they were communicating BEFORE attacking
    – Dan M
    Commented Sep 2 at 13:15
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    The key point here is the one about Cunningham in the Med, which is absolutely the best part of the answer. I think being so definitive about "This would never happen" hurts the rest of the answer. The scene in the movie is probably intended to illustrate the general dilemma (we can't take action on the basis of Enigma only in case the Germans guess we broke their code) in a scenario that is easy for the audience to understand, without it necessarily being accurate. Commented Sep 2 at 15:58
  • @DJClayworth I am very interesting about the source for Cunningham. The scene in the movie might be simplified, but in reality I think even a complex version of "we have to sacrifice them for the sake of secret" never happened. For Cunningham example, sending a recon is needed to confirm the tactical situation even if ENigma material has been used Commented Sep 2 at 18:43
  • Battle of the Bulge: Intelligence Lessons for Today has some insights about Ultra use in land theaters and very unlikely that decrypted Enigma documents were used tactically seems a bit too definitive a statement, depending on what counts as "tactical". "A system was devised whereby Allied operational commanders and their intelligence officers received all intercepted messages pertinent to their area of operations, generally within twenty-four hours of intercept." By 1944 tho, exploitation probably was gaining over secrecy calculus Commented Sep 2 at 22:58
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    @Jos I've added my response, with the source I've found
    – Dan M
    Commented Sep 3 at 8:14

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