Does any evidence exist that suggests Hitler’s primary reason for declaring war on America was an attempt to draw Japan into his war with Russia?

Question

During the first few months of the Nazi invasion of Russia, Stalin feared a Japanese attack from the east would create a two front war. In August, he was finally convinced by intelligence reports that the Japanese had no immediate plans for attacking Russia. As a result, he allowed well-trained, well-equipped Russian troops to be transferred west to assist in defense of Moscow. These additional 70 divisions played an important role in stopping the Nazis short of capturing the city.

It was during the same week that Hitler was becoming aware his forces simply could not capture Moscow in 1941, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor (December, 7). The U.S. declared war on Japan the next day. Between December 8 and 10, Hitler made the decision to declare war on America. He made the announcement in a speech on December 11, 1941.

This reason was NOT mentioned in his speech declaring war but then it would not be. Hitler would not have allowed the German people to know he needed any help in Russia--but he obviously did know--as his Generals were making it clear daily from December 5th on that the Russians had not ran out of troops or equipment and his armies were stuck.

I have researched this to death and cannot find any evidence in existence that supports my hunch this is true. I just want to see if any other history buffs know of anything I may have missed???

Answer 1

The decrypted "Ultra" evidence revealed in "Marching Orders" suggests just the opposite: that the Japanese were more likely to attack Soviet Siberia if the Germans were successful in the Soviet Union, e.g. at Moscow, Stalingrad and/or the Caucasus, than if they attacked the United States. Therefore, in theory, Hitler should have concentrated his arms production for a land war with the Soviet Union, rather than a naval war with the United States (and Britain).

Hitler attacked to the United States in order to "finish" destroying its navy. He rightly understood that the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor had left Japanese navy stronger. But he wrongly believed that the combination of the Japanese surface fleet and German submarines could administer the coup de grace to the American navy, and prevent America from "interfering" with either Germany or Japan in the eastern hemisphere.

What he did not count on was the American "rebuild" rate, which produced the equivalent of the Japanese and German navy every two years, and with plenty of capacity left over for air force and infantry weapons.

At the end of World War II, the single most important military force was the U.S. Pacific fleet. It impacted Japan, China, India, and today's "ASEAN" countries of Southeast Asia.