Yes, strong diplomatic and domestic opposition was the reason the intervention was abandoned.
The Siberian Intervention was not a profitable venture; it is remote, with a hostile populace, neighbours USSR, a large hostile nation, and whose resource riches could not be readily extracted. With no clear end in sight, domestic opposition grew.
And yet, while the
people were greatly cheered by the victories of the nation’s soldiers and
sailors in acquiring overseas possessions, the experience was inevitably
soured by the fact that they were required to pay for the increased defense
establishment necessary to hold the new gains. The Siberian Intervention
brought the Japanese people no victories to celebrate, no apparent opportunities
for profit, and no hope of a rapid conclusion. It should not surprise us
it was unpopular.
Why would being unpopular force a withdrawal? This can be surprising given what we know about how militaristic and expansionist Imperial Japan was, especially from the 1930's on. This is where the time period matters; although Imperial Japan has always had the fatal problem of military factionalism, the 1920's represented a brief resurgence in democracy and civilian government - sometimes called the "Taisho Democracy".
Things really became worse during the 1930's, with the Great Depression and economic troubles, a series of political assassinations, the annexation of Manchuria, leaving the League of Nations, all happened within this decade.
By contrast, the early 1920's saw Japan greatly affected by the victory of western democratic nations in WWI, chiefly Britain and USA, and there was a sense that Japan should embrace their values of democracy and international cooperation in order to achieve greatness, in stark contrast to the militaristic autarky of the defeated Central Powers, chiefly Germany, whose military was the model for Japan's.
Yet the immediate aftermath of World War I provided Japanese dissatisfied
with the imperial experience a new lexicon to criticize the imperial
adventure in Siberia and, indeed, a new paradigm by which to define the basic
characteristics of a “modern state.” The victorious “allied and associated”
powers shared a commitment to democracy, constitutionalism, and a
more cooperative style of foreign relations, rejecting the outright conquest
and drive for autarchy that had failed the central powers. To truly rank itself
among the rekkoku, or great powers, meant Japan too must embrace the
ideas, social institutions, and approaches to foreign relations that had seemingly
propelled Britain and the United States into the very front ranks of
international power. “The defeat of Germany,” said Hamaguchi Osachi of
the Kenseikai, “has deeply implanted the idea that bureaucratism and militarism
have declined and that politics must be modeled entirely upon democracy. The great tide of democracy is overwhelming the entire world
at this moment.”
Thus the intervention lacked legitimacy, both international and domestic. The intervention began as a multi-national venture to bring Russia back into WWI. The armistice rendered that moot, so the mission became the rescue of the Czechoslovak Legion. Once that was completed in 1920, everyone except Japan withdrew, isolating Japan, whose continued presence could not be seen as anything but expansionism. In later years, although Japan became isolated internationally, domestic legitimacy in their military adventures was still considered important, justified with reasons such as mutual prosperity and defense.
Reference: “A Great Disobedience Against the People”:
Popular Press Criticism of Japan’s Siberian
Intervention, 1918–22 by Paul E. Dunscomb
