It's unclear what the asked-about time frame is but since it seems you want to limit the question to Lenin's time.
The Red Army invasion of Georgia (12 February – 17 March 1921), also known as the Georgian–Soviet War or the Soviet invasion of Georgia, was a military campaign by the Russian Soviet Red Army aimed at overthrowing the Social Democratic (Menshevik) government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia (DRG) and installing a Bolshevik regime (Communist Party of Georgia) in the country.
Georgia is in Europe, albeit not in Western Europe.
Like I said in a comment, one cannot make a neat distinction between exporting revolution and incorporating lands in the USSR.
Please no "but it belonged to Russia before" Putin-style comments.
The People's Commissar of Nationalities Affairs, Joseph Stalin, who by the end of the Civil War had gained a remarkable amount of bureaucratic power, took a particularly hard line with his native Georgia. He strongly supported a military overthrow of the Georgian government and continuously urged Lenin to give his consent for an advance into Georgia. Soviet leadership had established a right to succession, but the precedence of the cause of socialism above national self-determination meant it was a flexible policy, and subject to debate. The People's Commissar of War, Leon Trotsky, strongly disagreed with what he described as a "premature intervention", explaining that the population should be able to carry out the revolution. Pursuant to his national policy on the right of nations to self-determination, Lenin had initially rejected use of force, calling for extreme caution in order to ensure that Russian support would help but not dominate the Georgian revolution; however, as victory in the Civil War drew ever closer, Moscow's actions became less restrained. For many Bolsheviks, self-determination was increasingly seen as a diplomatic game which has to be played in certain cases.
And since Georgia had a peace treaty with the USSR and was recognized internationally, the USSR had to come up with a pretext:
According to Moscow, relations with Georgia deteriorated over alleged violations of the peace treaty, the re-arrest by Georgia of Georgian Bolsheviks, obstruction of the passage of convoys to Armenia, and a suspicion that Georgia was aiding armed rebels in the North Caucasus.
As I see got some downvotes, sure color me thick, but perhaps some think that by "a European revolution" necessarily meant a simultaneous one, but although Lenin would have perhaps preferred if that were to happen somehow like that, he hardly considered it the only way, even in 1915
A United States of the World (not of Europe alone) is the state form of the unification and freedom of nations which we associate with socialism—about the total disappearance of the state, including the democratic. As a separate slogan, however, the slogan of a United States of the World would hardly be a correct one, first, because it merges with socialism; second, because it may be wrongly interpreted to mean that the victory of socialism in a single country is impossible, and it may also create misconceptions as to the relations of such a country to the others.
[...] the victory of socialism is possible first in several or even in one capitalist country alone. After expropriating the capitalists and organising their own socialist production, the victorious proletariat of that country will arise against the rest of the world—the capitalist world—attracting to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, stirring uprisings in those countries against the capitalists, and in case of need using even armed force against the exploiting classes and their states. A free union of nations in socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged and stubborn struggle of the socialist republics against the backward states.
So yeah, expansion by subversion/revolution plus war of the already socialist countries against the rest can easily be read into that as well.
And, yeah, if I also need to say this, a bit later Lenin started to emphasize that revolutions are more like to succeed in the periphery, where capitalism was weaker (contra Marx). E.g.
Lenin’s worldview shifted the revolutionary socialist struggle to the semi-peripheral countries of the East. In the Political Report to the Ninth All-Russian Conference of the Communist Party on 20 September 1920, he pointed out that, when account is taken of the population of the colonial areas, ‘seven-tenths of the [world] population, given a correct policy, would back Soviet Russia’ [...] He anticipated revolution spreading to oriental countries such as China. ‘[S]ubsequent revolutions in Oriental countries, which possess much vaster populations in a much vaster diversity of social conditions, will undoubtedly display even greater distinctions than the Russian Revolution’ (Our Revolution (16/17 January 1923))
So that's entirely consistent with subverting or conquering Russia's near-abroad first, revolutions in Asia etc. Not waiting/hoping for the miracle revolution in the advanced capitalist countries first or necessarily investing many resources in that. Which doesn't mean no resources were allocated at all for that, see the Comintern.
The total Comintern budget for 1922, as drawn up by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, was 2,950,600
gold rubles. With a rate of exchange of 10.5 gold rubles the equivalent
of $5, the budget was approximately $1.4 million in 1922 dollars
($19.1 million in 2012 values). Allocations to different parties ranged
from 500,000 gold rubles to the Germans ($3.3 million in 2012 values), 352,800 ($2.3 million in 2012 values) to the Americans, and
327,600 ($2.1 million in 2012 values) to the Czechoslovaks, down to
196,560 ($1.3 million in 2012 values) to the British and 155,763 ($1
million in 2012 values) to the Italians. The budget rose and fell over
the years. In 1925, the Comintern was allocated 4,180,450 gold rubles. In 1938, however, the Politburo approved the ECCI’s budget of
only 1,342,447 gold rubles.
Also see Stalin's pre-WW2 military adventures/support e.g. Xinjiang 1934 or 'Red' (Republican) Spain. 'Socialism in one country' didn't mean no support whatsoever for revolutions elsewhere.
And perhaps as prototyped in Spain (albeit it rather failed there), Stalin later pushed what's been called "revolution by degrees" i.e. creating broad leftist
coalitions that would take power with minimal Western objections, in order/hope to have Communist assert themselves among these later on. This, of course, like in Spain, worked better when there was Soviet military involvement/presence, as it would happen in Easter Europe after WW2.
The records of Stalin’s conversations with European Communists and the OMI’s
instructions to the European Communist Parties to establish that by spring 1943 the Kremlin had
developed and begun to execute a consistent political strategy designed to establish Communist-dominated coalition regimes in Eastern Europe in the near term and, over the longer term, to
foster the development of the Communist movement in Western Europe. As regards Eastern
Europe, the strategy was not a response to Western initiatives in the sense of being a defensive
reaction to Anglo–American intrusions into the Soviet sphere. Chronology alone precludes that. [...]
[Stalin's] policies during and after World War II amounted to “National Bolshevism”—the use of the Soviet state as an agent of revolutionary change. Stalin himself
said as much in 1940: “The action of the Red Army is also a matter of world revolution.”